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Robert Christopher Knight, A.B., Occidental College
M.A., San Diego State Ihiversity
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Directed by:

Associate Professor Howard Gadlin

Good Faith Social Science and the Activity of
Inquiry is a theoretical discussion of the relationship
of social science to social action.

It is argued that

the claim of empiricist social science that objective

knowledge may be accrued through proper scientific
methods is unfounded.

Moreover, such claims serve to

obscure the inherent relationships that must exist

between a scientist and those who are the subject of
inquiry.

The analysis focuses on the role of social

concepts as constituents of social reality and the
ways in which social scientific commerce in these concepts must necessarily implicate scientists in the dual

role of participant-inquirer.

This role places the in-

vestigator in the position of describing from
cular point of view, or social perspective.

V

a

parti-

Since the social scientific aspiration of accruing

objective facts is impossible, an alternative enterprise
is suggested.

Good faith social science is proposed as

a more legitimate form of social participation.

It is

proposed that the pursuit of theoretical self -conscious-

ness must be included as a crucial criterion of rigorous
social science.

Such self -consciousness is seen to emerge

from the conflicts and discourse between those holding

discrepant social commitments and incompatible social
concepts.

Such conflicts may not be argued in the arena

of empirical validity.

These conflicts involve the in-

terests of those who are committed to different ways of
life.

The disputes are inherently political.

It is

argued then that for social scientists, rigorous empirical research, theoretical self -consciousness

,

political

dispute, and social responsibility tend to merge within
the perspective of good faith social science.
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INTRODUCTION
The last decade may be described as a
period of

crisis in social psychology (Elms, 1975;
Armistead, 1974).
I believe this crisis can be
characterized fairly
as a

crisis of legitimacy and purpose.

In the face of critici sm
"

from a variety of philosophical perspectives (e.g.,
inter-

subjective approaches, phenomenology, critical theory)

methods of inquiry and even the status of social science
as a "true science" are beginning to appear questionable.

These questions are being raised not only in the distant

philosophical literature but more recently in specific
critiques in the familiar journals of the scientific

specialties
Of course, criticism of the experimental method and
the empiricist model of inquiry did not originate in this

decade.

And to be sure, many researchers in social psy-

chology and other social sciences have long operated in an
essentially positivist mode while holding considerable

misgivings about its limitations and even its legitimacy.
Nonetheless, when faced with philosophical critiques of

common empirical practices, those of us who consider ourselves active researchers are often shaken but rarely
moved.

While epistemological critiques may strike sym-

pathetic chords they do not often offer clear promise for
1

2

alternative investigative activities to
replace the well
established prescriptions of the empiricist
model and
the experimental method.
I,

like many of my colleagues, have found
myself

no longer satisfied with classical
methods of investigation.

Hence the crisis.

But enither have

drawn to alternative paradigms.

I

found myself

For the substantive

researcher there are no alternative systematic paradigms
to rival the experimental method for prescription
of

investigative activity and clear criteria of competency.
Such crises as we are experiencing are brought
about, at least partially, by effective criticism and

attack on the prevailing conceptions of legitimate activity and self-definition.

However, such a crisis will

soon foster a reactionary response unless viable alter-

natives begin to develop.

My concern is that substantive

researchers will not long suffer a paralyzing state of
crisis that does not allow continued empirical investigation with a sense of purpose and integrity.

And unless

the epistemological criticism of the experimental method
is followed by the development of more concrete alternative

activities of inquiry, we will return to (or continue with)

research approaches that allow robust, if not completely
satisfying, pursuit of our scientific interest in sub-

stantive social questions.

3

The following discussion will attempt to close the
gap between some critical epistemological literature and
the conduct of empirical investigations.

I

will attempt

to draw out the implications of interpretive (i.e., non-

positivist) models of inquiry for the substantive researcher.
I

will address myself not only to our philosophical selves

but also to the part of us that longs to pursue basic research, social curiosities, and pressing social issues with

intelligence, integrity and good faith.
I

invite the reader to join me in reconsidering the

social scientific enterprise, from the broadest perspective.
I

will examine alternately the criticisms of current re-

search practices in social psychology, the epistemological
foundations of American social science, and the activities
of conducting empirical research.

territory, gaining perspective,

I

I

will cover a large

hope, both from promon-

tory vistas and some focused close-ups.

will be omitted.

Necessarily, much

And, because it is my host discipline,

the preponderance of the discussion of social scientific

method will be considered within the context of social psychology.

Be that as it may,

I

am discussing here the

broad problematics of social inquiry and explanation, and
these problematics are endemic within all the social

sciences and their subfield specialties.

I

hope that

through the following very singular tour of our common

4

concerns new insights will emerge that may
in some way
contribute to a transformed profession of social
science.
In the first section

what

I

I

will attempt to refocus

consider to be a rather confusing array of criti-

cism in the social sciences.

We have, in fact, heard

an almost cacophonous racket of disgruntlement
in the

past few years, informed and uninformed, revisionist
and
radical.

I

will discuss the forms of these critiques as

they have emerged in the social psychological literature

(Chapter I), highlighting those elements which reject
the empiricist tradition and therefore suggest the most

challenging revision for the social scientific enterprise.
Chapter II will characterize an underlying epistemological

position that likewise abandons the empiricist perspective
and the pursuit of social "facts."

I

will argue that

social concepts are inherently contestable and that the

use of particular social concepts must implicate the user
in a set of social commitments that help consitute a

way of life.

This epistemological position suggests the

foundation for an alternative more self-conscious and
rigorous practice of social science.

I

will propose new

aspirations and guides to the scientific way of life.

I

will propose the development of a Good Faith Social Science
Chapter III redirects attention to the actual conduct
of empirical research.

If the criticisms of current no-

tions in social science are to have any meaning then they
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must touch upon not only the more general
philosophicaltheoretical concerns but also the activities
of conducting
substantive inquiry.
There is a rather substantial
liter-

ature in social psychology which has been
attempting to

reformulate or expand the repertoire of research
strategies in the "behavioral" sciences.
The third chapter will
review this discussion, refocusing attention on the
in-

evitable role of the researcher as actor and decision

maker in the research relationship.
In Chapter IV

I

will consider researcher actions

and decisions as defining and constraining researcher-

participant relationships.

At the same time,

these re-

lationships must constrain the range of possible empirical
results.

I

will argue that these relationships and the

behavioral regularities and empirical findings that emerge
from them are all implicated within social commitments
to particular ways of life.

Therefore, empirically de-

rived social "facts" are limited by the socially constructed commitments within which they exist.
Finally,

since social commitment and empirical re-

lationships are seen as internally related, self-consciousness
about these commitments will be viewed as a necessary

element of any social science that pretends to be rigorous
and explicit (Chapter V).

consciousness and what

I

Moreover, the pursuit of selfam calling Good Faith Social

Science will necessarily engage difficult issues concerning
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the legitimacy of social perspectives and
social commit-

ments.

Rigorous social science and concerns with social

responsibility will tend to merge.
is true,

And insofar as this

social scientists in good faith will face some

difficult issues in the arena of social responsibility,
that is, in the arena of politics.

CHAPTER

I

CURRENT CRITICISM OF RESEARCH IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY:
EMPIRICISM, REVISIONS, AND REJECTIONS

American social psychology, perhaps more than
some
other social sciences, may be noted for a strong
orientation toward controlled experimental methods as
a strategy

of research.

This emphasis is easily discernable over a

variety of interest areas.

Doctoral students' training

in social psychology is typically stronger in
experimental

methods than it is in other alternative approaches.

The

most prestigious journals reflect the same method values
in title and content.

The Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology

The Journal of Experimental Social

and

Psychology both publish a preponderance of highly controlled

experiments (Kigbee and Wells, 1972).

And even a cursory

reading of other APA journals reveals the same emphasis
(Ge rgen,

1975).

Moreover, the preeminence of experimental

approaches is not limited to researchers pursuing questions in laboratory settings.
is

The experimental paradigm

often considered the most efficacious approach to social

evaluation (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Cook and Campbell,
1975) as well as studies of setting effects on behavior in
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naturally occurring ecologies (e.g.,
Willems. 1977;
Tunnell,

1977).

A survey of recent criticisms of research
methods in
social psychology reveals a mixed-bag of
attacks on
"the

experimental method," "laboratory techniques,"
and/or
the underlying assumptions of this
"empiricist tradition."

Within the professional journals of the field
however,
critiques most frequently focus on procedures,
techniques,
and strategies without questioning the basic
experimental

paradigm or the objectives of an empiricist social science.
It is

much less common to read analyses of the experimental

approach which call into question the tenets of its episte-

mological foundation.
The distinction between revisionist

proposals and

more thorough-going criticisms of empiricism have too often

been blurred and misapprehended.
found,

The differences are pro-

and any attempt to address the current malaise and

crisis in social science must first identify and distin-

guish between expressions of revisionist empiricism and

alternatives that suggest another epistemological perspective

.

Empiricism in Social Psychology

A short summary of basic elements of empiricism in
American social psychology will have the ring of familiarity to almost all active researchers.

However, we normally
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refer to these elements not as one
philosophical position
but rather as the "foundations of
the scientific endeavor."
If it can be said that there is
a dominant paradigm
in social psychology, then its basic
outlines certainly
reside in part within the epistemic
perspectives and goals
of the enterprise.
Underlying a variety of methods and
strategies of inquiry there are a limited
number of shared
goals and assumptions that have allowed a
certain unity to
social psychology as well as the other sciences
of human
social interaction.
To reject these shared perspectives,
it is thought,

is to run the risk of placing oneself

outside the community of social science.

A review of the

most prominent canons of this empiricist tradition will
serve to clarify the fundamental differences between pop-

ular revisionist proposals and the more thoroughgoing
critiques
The central concern of science is held to be the

establishment of geneval laws through systematic observation.

Even the most superficial examination of the social

psychological literature fixes this objective as holding
paramount importance, no less than in the physical sciences
(DiRenzo,

1966;

Krech,

Crutchfield, and Ballachy, 1966;

Jones and Gerard, 1969; Runkel and McGrath, 1972; Crano
and Brewer, 1973; Brandt, 1972; Manis, 1975; Thorngate,
1975).

While "descriptive" research may be a legitimate

intermediate step in a program of study, the ultimate aim
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of establishing general laws of
human interaction rema:ims
In the end,

social science seeks to establish
stable concepts and laws that will not change
their meaning across
situations, times, cultures, etc.
The principles of "attitude change," "social learning," "needachievement
,

"internality-extemality," "undermanning-overmanning

,

"small group process," etc., may be thought
to be incomplete, or even incorrect.
But these are nonetheless concepts,

theories and models in pursuit of general laws
of

social behavior.
It follows,

that if we are searching for "general

laws" of human interaction then our criteria for
empiric-

ally demonstrating such laws must include a moment of
prediction.

The strong version of this criterion of

scientific inquiry states that complete explanation carries

predictive power.

Because, unlike the physical sciences,

social interaction is always immersed in "open systems"

of influences social theories are not expected to perfectly

predict behavior.

The social sciences have therefore

adopted the "probabilistic" or weaker version of the
criterion of prediction.
The arbiters of competing explanations (i.e., gen-

eral laws, or theories) are the emipivioal tests of their

predictions in the observable events which follow from
the theory.

Theories are tested; predictions of observ-

able events are made.

As a result of the process of pitting
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competing explanations against each
other, examining
their ability to predict a range
of observable events,
inadequate theories are rejected or
revised and more
adequate theories are retained.
Through this manner of
testing, knowledge of the general
laws of human
inter-

action is said to accrue.
My objective here has not been to
comprehensively

review the empiricist foundations of social
psychological inquiry.

Rather,

I

have attempted only to remind

the reader of some of the most pervasive
canons of this

philosophical position, those that have become
virtually
synonymous with the conduct of social science.
The point
then is to note some criteria from the empiricist
concep-

tion of science that have become so much a part
of the

social sciences that they often escape examination.

In-

deed, we are often in danger of believing that the
"pur-

suit of general laws," the criterion of "prediction,"

and "relative theoretical efficacy" define the activity

of true science.

And to be sure, even some of the

severest critics of social psychological inquiry have
also assumed this empiricist perspective on science.

Methodological Revisions in
the Empiricist Tradition
There are a variety of familiar complaints and sug-

gested revisions for the common practices of experimental
social psychology.

Most of these take the laboratory
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experiment as their target for criticism
and focus primarily on technical-procedural issues.
Experiments are
thought to be simple-mindedly limited
to linear relationships involving a minimum number of
variables, while
social phenomena are complex and multifaceted.
The

development of more sophisticated multivariate
statistical
techniques is recommended (McGuire,
1973).
Experimenter
artifacts haunt the endeavor with their
potential biasing
effects:
demand characteristics, evaluation apprehension,
etc.

1975).

(Orne,

1962;

Rosenberg, 1969; Gadlin and Ingle,

Rigorous research, a code word for the experiment,

is seen as eliciting a type of reactance from
subjects

resistant to the controlling atmosphere of experimental

procedures (Argyris, 1968).

Attempts to predict social

behavior are thought to be doomed by the open textured
nature of the phenomena; each new circumstance adds higher
order interactions to analyses, befuddling attempts at

prediction and replication (Cronbach, 1975).

Others argue

that social psychologists have given insufficient atten-

tion to the centrality of social meanings in shaping social

behavior.

Indeed,

a

number of these authors contend that

social scientists will not develop any systematic knowledge

about social behavior until phenomenological realities,
meanings, and rules are more adequately included in

scientific research (e.g., Harre and Secord, 1972;

Bronfenbrenner

,

1974,

1977).
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All other criticisms aside,
however, the major
thrust of dissatisfaction with
the laboratory experimental method has concerned its
"artificiality" or as
some have called it. its lack
of "ecological validity."
Perhaps the best known for their
position on the essential importance of research "in
situ" have been the
ecological psychologists (e.g.. Barker.
1965.

1968,

1969;

Willems, 1969; Wright, 1967; Gump and
Kounin, 1960).
Along with others, they argue that an
understanding of the
behavior patterns of individuals and groups
cannot arise
from collecting data that is wrenched from
natural contexts and "behavior settings."

The context is viewed as

an essential part of the phenomena of
social behavior.

There is a call for greater documentation of
the distri-

bution of phenomena in nature, in the "investigator-free"
environment (Willems, 1969, 1977; Elms, 1975; Sells,
1974).
If they are not shunned completely as impediments
to the

lawful explanation of human behavior manipulation and
control, as the hallmarks of the laboratory experiment,
are looked upon with suspicion (Bass,

1974;

Brandt, 1972;

Gump and Kounin, I960; Willems, 1969, 1977).

Those authors listed above, and others (e.g.,

Bronfenbrenner, 1974, 1977; Feldman. Hass, and Wilbur.
1970;

Fredrickson, 1972), have certainly contributed

measurably to widening the perspectives of social psychologists insensitive to the role of social and physical

14

contexts in social behavior.

They may even have contri-

buted to some of the uneasiness we
feel about our empirical work.
Be that as it may, it would appear
that
the empiricist goal of general laws,
and the development
of objective knowledge through
prediction tests and
theoretical competition remain for many
unchanged.
A
few sample quotations from prominent
critics may illustrate this point.
.behavior is largely aontvolled by
the environmental setting in which it
occurs and,
.changing the environmental setting will result in changes
in behavior.
(Willems, 1977, p. 51)
.

.

.

.

(Behavioral ecology) will provide oompvehensive^ progressive, and cumulative
information on ecobehavioral systems
homes, schools, and many other institutions
and settings.
(Willems, 1977, p. 64)

—

Until we can assign to environmental
variables the proportions of variance in
behavior for which they account, our
understanding of behavior will be incomplete.

(Sells,

1969, p.

26)

.investigators that have combined the
three dimensions (of naturalistic research)
have accrued at least three advantages:
(a) New empirical laws have been discovered,
(b) the research has been made more credible
to participants, thereby increasing internal
validity, and (c) the research has been
given greater external validity a valued
asset in a discipline supposedly concerned
with real-world events.
(Tunnell, 1977,
.

.

,

p.

426)

In the first instance we shall be trying to
devise a system of concepts for understanding
social interactions and to check this system
against reality.
It may be that after generations of human ethogenists have studied the
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lives of men women, and children,
they may
come to see that certain very
subtle patterns
Laws.
But though our methodology
assume this, it must be such that cannot
it may ullaws.
(Harre
^/
^in^i^^
^^^fo^?
and Secord,
1972, p. 129)
[in all quotations,

emphasis is mine]

The preceding summary of empiricist
currents in

social psychology should be noncontroversial
to most observers as well as participants in the
field.
It does
not take a cracker- jack investigative
reporter to discern
that the overriding goal of most social
scientists is to

discover general laws through empirical testing.

It is,

in fact, no more than a reaffirmation
to find that well-

known critics of current empirical methods share this
objective and its underlying epistemological perspectives.
Critiques of Empiricism in
Social Fsychology
In recent years some scholars have taken a much

deeper critical view of theory and research in social
psychology.

Informed by critics of empiricism in both

the philosophical and sociological literature, they have

cast doubt on the basic tenets underlying research activities and theory building.

These forms of argument ques-

tion the most basic propositions of the empiricist per-

spective:

(1)

that the rigors of systematic observation,

predictive criteria, and theory testing may achieve the
detached objectivity required for discovering general laws
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of social behavior, and
(2) social phenomena are stable
and transhistorical and therefore
appropriately describable by general laws.
The bottom line contention is
that the social sciences do not
and cannot assume a detached perspecitve on social phenomena.
As social
scientists, as social beings ourselves,
we are intimately
intertwined in the social world we pretend
to dispassionately describe. The social scientist,
the profession of
social science, the society, and the
description of
abstracted social phenomena mutually constitute
each
other.

Denial of this relationship in assuming the
em-

piricist perspective is then seen as a major
impediment
to the understanding of human social actions.

For social psychologists the most familiar example

of such relational critiques may be the often
cited

article by Kenneth Gergen (1973), "Social Psychology
as

History."

Social behavior patterns that have been theo-

retically characterized as, for example, "the authoritarian personality," "conformity," "affiliation," or
"social comparison" were seen as primarily historical

phenomena rather than basic psychological processed.

As

historical periods, cultures, and subcultures change these

phenomena would also be altered.

In this way it was

claimed that "while methods of research are scientific
in character,

theories of social behavior are primarily

17

reflections of contemporary history"!

(p.

309).

Gergen

takes the position that social
behavior and social meaning arise out of social
relationships embedded in cultural-

historical contexts.
The primary concern for us here,
is the relationship between the scientific
community and the society.
Not only are the phenomena of
social scientific study
seen as historically transient, but,
according to Gergen,
the social scientist is implicated
as a moving force in
this process.
Not only do we study behavior,
isolate concepts, and describe lawful relationships,
we also make
these analyses available (albeit indirectly)
to those we
have observed.
There is a kind of feedback loop between

social science and society.

Concepts such as "authoritar-

ian behavior," "dogmatism," or "reinforcement"
seep into
the folk culture through such outlets as
Psychology Today

or the paperback book trade.

This may happen despite the

best efforts at abstruse jargon and technical language.

Based on common values of freedom and individuality,
people
are resistant to seeing themselves as predictable in
the

way theoretical positions depict them.

And knowledge of

this social psychological theory then becomes an oppor-

tunity for liberating oneself from that predictable
^Gergen (1973) has been criticized for basing his
arguments on superficial phenomena and ignoring truly
transhistorical and abstract "process models" of social
behavior (Schlenker, 1974; Manis, 1975).
For counter arguments to this "historical variability" but "process
invariance" argument see Gergen (1976), Hendricks (1974),
and Thorngate (1975).
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pattern of behavior.
view,

This is especially true,

in Gergen's

since so many theories are
prescriptive.

We prefer
to be "unauthoritarian." certainly
not "conforming," or

susceptable to every manipulative attempt
to "change our
attitudes.
As a general surmise,

sophistication as to
psychological principles liberates one from
their behavioral implications.
Established
principles of behavior become inputs into
one s decision making.
As Winch (1959)
has pointed out, "Since understanding
something involves understanding its contradiction, someone who, with understanding
performs X must be capable of envisioning
the possibility of doing not X"
(p. 89)
Psychological principles also sensitize
one to influences acting on him and draw
attention to certain aspects of the environment and himself.
In doing so, one's
patterns of behavior may be strongly in_

fluenced.

I

(Gergen,

would not like to

1973, p.

313)

dwell too much on Gergen's

introduction of the relational problems of an empiricist

pursuit of general laws.

Indeed,

social scientific theory

may so effect society as to be the impetus for its own
invalidation.

And as Gergen ironically points out, the

most suitable protection against such eventualities might
be a more active concealment of scientific findings.
.science could be removed from the
public domain and scientific understanding reserved for a select elite.
(p. 314)
.

.

But Gergen has only addressed a portion of the relational

critique of empiricist aspirations.

If social science is

so immersed in society that its theory may alter current

19

historical patterns of behavior

,

then we must consider

that current and local history may
also help constitute
the questions, perspectives, and
general laws of the
science

Observing that social science and society
are
mutually constitutive or, as here, noting
the influence
of cultural history on scientific concepts
and "general
laws" is much more than accusation of
failure
to be

"value-neutral."

Gergen's observation that many social

psychological concepts contain "prescriptive bias"
(e.g.,
authoritarian-nonauthoritarian) is one familiar version
of this accusation that the social scientist often
indulges

his/her value commitments in "describing" concepts.

But

these values are surface phenomena, easily discerned
and

articulated, and indeed, by Gergen's argument, consciously

normative to the extent that public (non-scientific)
knowledge of the behavioral indices of say "authoritarianess" or "conformity" leads to widespread avoidance of
these behaviors.

So the argument goes,

given a moral

dimension within the phenomena under study social scientists cannot observe objectively but inevitably tilt to

one moral alternative or the other.
To suggest that social science and society mutually

constitute each other through their concepts and perspectives is to raise a much more serious criticism.

Some

have argued that both social science and society are formed
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and understood within the same
systematic body of concepts and a particular manner of
thinking.
For example,
a recent article by Edward
Sampson, "Psychology and the
American Ideal" (1977), reviewed the
cultural and historical ideology of "self-sufficient
individualism" and
its penetration of such theoretical
models as androgyny,
mental health and moral development,
equity theory, the

teacher-scholar model, and encounter group
research.
noting the relationship of an American ideology

In

of

individualism in forming current conceptions of
androgyny
(which emerges as a rather super- individual)
to replace

"less healthy" masculine or feminine sex roles,
Sampson

illustrated some of the contradictions of an empiricist
perspective.
It seems that we have adoped only one
form of synthesis as the preferred mode,
in part because we are blinded by our own
cultural heritage and have difficulty in
seeing its impact on our formulations
in part because we have few theories or
methods that direct us toward alternative
formulations. What I am saying, therefore,
is that within an individualistic historical and cultural ethos, the selfcontained individual, the androgynous type
for example, is the ideal.
In an alternative system, however, that same character is neither ideal nor perhaps desirable.
Androgyny as a sign of good
health thereby reflects an individualistic social arrangement in which persons
wish to be self-contained and selfsufficient in order to be successful,
(p.

774)

In this connection, it is important to
note that I am not disputing the research
findings involving androg3niy and selfesteem and androgjmy and improved
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adaptability.

am attempting to locate
^^^^^ P^°P^^ historical
anf ^.nl'^^'T"
and
cultural context
and view them thereby
as syntheses that are uniquely
our contemporary individualisticsuited to
and selfcontained ideal.
Likewise, by placing the concept
of
androgyny within its historical
and cultural setting we can see that
androgyny
IS neither a necessary, an
inevitable
nor a fundamentally more desirable
psychological quality.
(Sampson, 1977, p. 774)
I

,

These comments illustrate several
disturbing themes
for the scientist pursuing general
laws through empirical
theory testing.
Social psychology, and social scientists,
are so immersed in cultural ideologies
(such as self-

sufficient individualism as an ideal type) that
the conceivable "descriptive" concepts even alternative
and

competing concepts (e.g., masculine-feminine sex
roles in
America vs. androgyny), tend to be tightly
bounded and
restricted.

Moreover, theoretical tests of say "the adapt-

ability of androg3mous sex roles" are empirically selfconfirming within a cultural ethos and social structure
that support the individualist ideal.
is not already obvious,

I

might add, if it

that a belief that general laws

are confirmed through these "tests" of empirical prediction

simply adds to the invisibility of the underlying cultural

perspectives and social structures that predispose the
results
Other social scientists have also criticized the
field for inattention to the relationship of scientific
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concepts with the larger society,
culture and subcultural
ideologies and even the local
interactions within the
research activity itself (e.g..
Buss, 1975; Bronf enbrenner
1977).
Sigmund Koch, for example, reconsidering
what
he had learned in his classic
work Psychology: A Study
of a Science (1959, 1962, 1962) has
commented.
.it should be emphasized that
paradigms." theories, models (or
whatever one's label for conceptual
ordering devices) can never prove preemptive or preclusive of alternative
organizations.
That is so for any
field of inquiry, but conspicuously
so in relation to the psychological
and social studies.
The presumption
on the part of their promulgators that
the gappy, sensibility-dependent, and
often arbitrary paradigms of psychology
do encapsulate pre-emptive truths is
no mere cognitive blunder.
Nor can it
be written off as an innocuous excess
of enthusiasm.
It raises a grave moral
issue reflective of a widespread moral
bankruptcy within psychology.
In the
psychological studies, the attribution
to any paradigm of a pre-emptive finality has the force of telling human beings
precisely what they are, of fixing their
essence, defining their ultimate worth,
potential, meaning; cauterizing away
that quality of ambiguity, mystery,
search, that makes progress through a
biography an adventure.
(Koch, 1977
.

p.

5-6)

The mutually constitutive relationship of social

science with the social phenomena of its interest has been

analyzed not only at the broad level of science and society,
concepts and ideology, but also within the local interactions of the researcher and those being researcher.

In

two related papers Gadlin and Ingle (1975) and Ingle (1977)
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have reconsidered the experimental
paradigm in social
psychology in terms of its underlying
"objectivist"
(read empiricist) perspective
and consequent failure to
consider the relational character of
the experimentersubject encounter.
Interestingly, they find that social
psychologist have rarely utilized social
psychological
findings to gain understanding of the
social psychology
experiment.
An examination of recent literature
revealed
some instructive and disturbing findings
that cast doubt
on the possibility of constructing a
social science of
general laws independent of the relationship
of the

scientist/researcher with his/her "subjects."

Assuming

the role of the dispassionate empiricist,
social experi-

menters have become unaware of their own role in
the
empirical findings which they generate.

Looking at the

social behavior of others, social psychologsits have
found
that:

(1)

the presence of a potentially evaluative audi-

ence systematically alters persons' task performance,
(2)

when attributing the causes of events actors tend to

see these as more often residing in the social or physical

environment while observers attribute causes to internal
actor dispositions, and

(3)

in assymetrical power rela-

tionships (physical, expert, or social power) the participants act out their roles through social power self-

presentation and ingratiation, respectively.

It takes

very little reflection to recognize the relevance of these
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social relationship phenomena
for the encounter of the
social scientist with his/her
experimental "subjects."
While their arguments focused
largely on the particular
relationship of the social psychological
experimenter
to his/her subjects, it is
clear that we cannot escape
this relational critique merely
by leaving the laboratory
setting or pursuing unobstrusiveness
in our observations.
.any attempt to describe the ideal
research relationship would be.
sighted— all research relationships shortimpose their own unique set of limitations
upon the knowledge which they eventually
produce.
Thus, the question of an appropriate research relationship is asked
prematurely if questions of content and
the uses of that content are not
adequately
addressed first.
(Ingle, 1977,
87)
•

.

.

p.

We are suggesting that we abandon what
we consider a futile attempt to control,
inhibit, or deny the relational aspect
of research.
Rather, we suggest that
the relational quality of research be
attended to; that it be developed and
^nvestigated.
(Gadlin and Ingle, 1975,

The authors suggest that advances in social
psychological

research will depend in part on our,
.acknowledging that the study of
human behavior necessarily includes the
behavior of psychologists.
This recognition implies, of course, that the
psychologist is as prone to psychological
processes as anyone else, and should be
especially self-conscious of this fact
when acting as a scientist. This selfconsciousness includes the psychologist's
awareness of his relation to and with
his subject matter, and the awareness of
his own role with respect to inquiry.
The knowledge that derives from such
.

.
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Current Criticism and the
Conduct ot Social S"ETinrP

Criticisms such as those discussed
above, criticisms
which question basic aspirations
and procedures, have made
very few inroads into the actual
conduct of inquiry
in

social science.

Of course, many if not most,

social sci-

entists are familiar with the
criticisms sporadically appearing in the literature. And many of
us are at least
partially aware of the robust literature
in the philosophical disciplines that is questioning
empiricist perspectives
and developing alternative views of
science.
If these
positions are found to be interesting, then
they are too
often interesting as mere intellectual
curiosities.
If
the criticism is disturbing,

this disturbance is an under-

current that wells up small whirlpools of
doubt but does
not significantly change the current of the
empiricist
stream.

The crisis in social psychology and other social

sciences is played out in occasional critical articles,
small and isolated pockets of deviant scientists, and
in
the silent and personal doubts of mainstream researchers.

Perhaps this is, if you will, normal for a crisis.

Following the analysis of Thomas Kuhn (The Structure
of Saientifia Revolutions

,

1962),

I

would agree that old

paradigms are replaced by more promising paradigms rather
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abandoned in the face of
criticism.

And

believe such
an analysis takes us some
distance in understanding
the
tenacity of the empiricist
perspective in theface of
recent criticism.
The great majority of
social scientists are very practical-minded
men and women intent
on pursuing substantive
questions.
The empiricist tradition has allowed them a robust
perspective and procedure
I

within which to indulge their
desires to answer these
nagging questions about social
behavior.
Philosophical
criticism or general critiques within
the social

sciences

may raise doubts.

But the empiricist perspective
will

not be abandoned without a clearer
promise for an alternative paradigm.
In the succeeding chapters,

I

would like to offer

an analysis of scientific activities
that may move us
beyond the more general or philosophical
criticism toward
an alternative empirical social science
without empiricism.
I will argue that the presumptions
and tenets of philo-

sophical empiricism are demonstrably untenable.

That is

not to say that systematic observation has no
place in
social science.

I

do not wish to dispute the centrality

of empirical research for a legitimate social science.
I

do dispute the empiricist conception of empirical

activity and empirical aspirations.

Empiricism places

systematic observation within a value-free enterprise,

objectively establishing "basic knowledge," and "facts."
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will argue that this empiricist
enterprise grossly misapprehends the relationship between
the empirical research of social scientists and
the social phenomena under
investigation.
In making this argument I
will attempt
to address two broad issues:
(1) translating epistemological critiques of empiricism into
the familiar problematics
we face in considering strategies
of inquiry and,
I

(2)

analyzing the deep implications of a
non-empiricist perspective, a new way of life for the
social scientist.
will begin this analysis by first
stepping back to
reconsider some discussions from the
epistemological
I

literature.

It is true that the criticisms that
have

appeared in the social sciences are informed
by or have
derived from the more basic philsophical
discourse.

they are not of the same form or logic.

I

But

believe the

translations from this literature by social scientists
have not always captured the full importance
and perti-

nence of the philosophical discussions.

Therefore,

I

will

briefly characterize my reading of epistemological literature that has focused criticism on empiricist suppositions.
I

will argue that social scientists oannot detach

themselves from the social concepts that are the subject
of inquiry.

I

will argue that social concepts are not

just phenomena (located out there in the world)

social commitments that can and do change.

;

they are

They are social

commitments that help constitute a way of life.

From this
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discussion

will suggest an alternative
epistemological
base for the conduct of inquiry.
This then will set the
stage for considering the
implications of
I

such an alter-

native for the way of life we have
come to call social
science

CHAPTER

II

GOOD FAITH SOCIAL SCIENCE

The world is for us what is presented
through our concepts. That is not to
say that our concepts may not changebut when they do, that means that our
concept of the world has changed too
(Winch, 1958, p. 15)

Making sense of the world and the use of social
concepts in doing so is, of course, not a uniquely

scientific activity.
existence,

l^mo

It is at the heart of human social

are kinsmen?

VJhat is a

mistake?

What

kinds of activities speak of intelligence or insanity?
I>niat

is a cause?

"The world is for us what is presented

through our concepts."

For social science no less than

for other realms of social life the process of forming

concepts lies at the very heart of all our undertakings.

And if we are to understand the dimensions of our social

existence we must come to grips with this process of

conceptualization which helps constitute our reality.
I

would like to argue that social scientists are necessav-

ily active agents in the social construction of reality.

Moreover, this participant relationship is precisely what
the empiricist tradition denies and therefore obscures.

A Good Faith Social Science must place self -consciousness
29
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and explicitness about scientists'
social participation
at the center of the enterprise.

Social science is, of course, in
a special position
with respect to social concepts.
Everyone participates
in the construction of social
reality.
However, as social
scientists we are not only social
participants, but at the
same time we are engaged in the
profession of social explanation.
Social explanation is the raison d'entre
of
the social scientific profession.
We have taken social

concepts as our coin.

conceptual reality.

We are, in a sense, merchants in
But concepts then become both the

currency of our world and the products of our enterprise.
We are at the same time participants in the making
and

brokers in the exchange.

And our most serious challenges

are to avoid inadvertently brokering in counterfeit concepts.

If we are to trade in social concepts and explan-

ations, if we presume to be social scientists, then we

must come to grips with this inherent com^plicity.

Attention has too long been diverted from the basic
social scientific problematic of concept formation.

The

statistical and experimental technology for manipulating

observed and conceptualized phenomena has been developing
at a staggering rate.

Scientists have become dazzled and

enchanted by their

mechanical handywork

o\<fn

state of entrancement

,

.

In this

scientists have lost touch with

their attachments and intimacy with the theoretical con-
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cepts that have been reduced to mere
objects and manipulanda.

Before we can consider the methods
and strategies
of inquiry we must reconsider our
relationship
to the

substance of our investigations.

We must reexamine the

scientific problematic of description and
characterization.
We must rediscover our relationships
within the
social experience of conceptualizing and
ordering the

phenomenal world.

This chapter will attempt to re-place

social scientific activities within the social
fabric.
I

will further argue that with the realization of
social

attachments must come a reorientation to the tasks of
social science.

The pretensions of empiricist detach-

ment are untenable.

We must begin to develop a social

science that not only recognizes its embededness in social

relationships but also its obligations to participate in
good faith.

De scribing From a Normative
Point of View

Borrowing an analogy (Connolly, 1974), it may be
said that the connection between the substance of empir-

ically verified "facts" and the terms and concepts of
theoretical formulation are comparable in some respects
2

to the relationship of a jury to a legal system.
2

The discussions of "describing from a point of
view," "describing from a moral point of view," and
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The jury examines the evidence
and
reaches a verdict, but prior to
its
"^li^^^^f^io^s, the judge, acting as
official interpreter of the law,
charges
the jury with a set of responsibilities
establishes what can be considered as
evidence, and specifies what constitutes
a punishable offense.
If, for instance
the jury is to decide whether the
defendant negligently caused or contributed
to
injuries received by the plaintiff the
judge instructs the jury as to what sort
of conduct legally constitute
"negligence"
and contributory negligence", he also
informs the jury where the burden of proof
rests and screens claims from it, such as
hearsay" testimony, that are not legally
admissible as evidence.
In charging the
jury and in regulating the presentation
of evidence to it, the judge, we might
say, specifies the terms within which
the
jury considers evidence and reaches a
verdict.
(p. 2)
'

It is my position that empirical conclusions
are nec-

essarily defined and limited by the dimensions of their

constituent theoretical terms and concepts.

Our con-

cepts dictate the domain and structure of the "reality"
to be observed and measured.

Alternative conceptions

may constitute the phenomenal world into incommensurate
realities.

And if this is true, then the empiricist

contention that competing theoretical conceptions may
be empirically compared and tested for their "truth"

potential is without foundation.

It is a contention

that requires a singular reality and conceptual domain

"essentially contested concepts" are indebted to
William E. Connolly's analyses of these issues in
The Terms of Political Discourse (1974) and some
personal communications (1977)
My presentations
of these issues are essentially the same as Connolly's.
.
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as foundation for its empirical
arbitration.

situation is not to name
Inr.P^^-''^^\^
something, but to characterize
it
Thus
when
we
say'"Empir4
qLf^'V-i^^^^M^^^^^S
State Building" or "Jim", we are
when we
say that the building is very
tall and
made of grey concrete or that Jim
is a
quiet, intense person who is
quite industrious
It is the tendency to think of
describing as if it were the same thins
as naming that accounts for so
many commentators ignoring a fundamental feature
of description:
A description does not
refer to data or elements that are bound
together merely on the basis of similarities
adhering
them, but to describe is to
characterize a situation from the vantage
point of certain interests, purposes or
standards.
Connolly, 1974, pp. 22-23)

m

The proposition that to describe is to
charac-

terize from one or more points of view would
seem an

innocent enough observation.

Consider some examples.

The definition of a chair is indeed contained in
its

purpose.

A chair may take on

a

variety of shapes,

textures, and styles; but an object is a chair from
the point of view of its "sitableness

.

"

Indeed, a

broad assortment of objects may be used for this purpose.
And any number of objects may become chairs or benches,
but only when they are seen as "sitable" objects.

Unruly

weeds become herbs only when we discover their properties

of taste, or medicines when they are believed to have
curative uses.

When terms such as "dangerous," "fearful,"

or "menacing" are used to describe persons or settings

they are used to call attention to features which may be

harmful to participants.

These terms do not "name" a
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reality, they orient the
listener to certain characteristics; and these characterizations
serve the purpose of issuing a warning.

Beyond describing from a point
of view, the terms
and concepts of human discourse
are often dese.i^tions
from a moral or normative point
of view.
And this is
especially true as we go beyond
physical objects to
consider personal and social
characterizations.
Genocide,
racism, aggression, altruism,
intelligence, and personal
control are all terms which describe
from an evaluative
and normative point of view, or they
are in the words of
Julius Kovesi (1967) "moral notions."
Such concepts are
moral notions in that while certain
specified conditions
must be met before the concepts may be
applied, these
concepts are also to a large extent
constituted by their
appraisive or evaluative meaning.

A term such as aggression may be applied to
wide range of human activities.

a

very

There are, to be sure,

some socially established limiting conditions
for its

application.

It is a description from a moral point

of view not in the sense that to say someone was aggressive
is always to say they were wrong, but rather in the
sense

that the concept would not be formed unless there was
some point in doing so--unless we shared a moral point

of view that this concept concretizes and reflects.

Any

act that may be described as aggressive must also appear
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liable to moral injunctions.

In the same way that

candidates for the term chair must have
certain characteristics which allow sitting (a reasonably
flat horizontal surface, for instance), actions
which may be
characterized as aggressive must have some
attributes
which could lead us to condemn the agent.
In this way
the criteria and the moral point of
a concept are dialectically related; it is from the point of view
of the

kind of conduct which we consider unacceptable
that the
concept "aggression" is formed. And it is only
if
the

acts meet these criteria that we have reason to
accuse
the agent of being aggressive.

Moral or normative notions, concepts which describe

from a moral point of view, may vary in their level of

completeness (Kovesi, 1967; Connolly, 1974).

Murder, for

example, is a relatively complete moral notion.

Inten-

tionally taking the life of another for personal advantage
3

Some might suggest that behavioral operationalization could be used to avoid the normative elements of
common language concepts such as "aggression". But it
is clear that this strategy cannot succeed in avoiding
the normative dimensions of a concept without at the same
time fundamentally changing its meaning.
The elements
of any operational definition must either reflect the
moral point of the concept, or on the other hand, adopt
definitional elements that alter its existing normative
point, or seek a level of abstraction that dismembers
the concept by wrenching all moral perspective from it.
That is, the would be "neutral observer" must adopt the
prevailing normative contours and behavioral criteria
of a concept or unilaterally and arbitrarily change the
perspective.
In the latter case the scientist is of course
dealing with a concept without social connection or social
meaning

constitutes adequate reason for
condemnation.
is indeed little room for
the "good murder."

Ther e
Of cour se

other concepts share this characteristic
of relative
moral completeness.
The absurdity of violating the
moral point of such concepts may serve
as the best
illustration.

What could one possibly mean by the

terms "ethical genocide" or "justifiable
racism."

But

other concepts that describe from a moral
point of
view are relatively incomplete. While there

is a moral

point which helps constitute the term, there is
room
for extenuating circumstances or special
conditions.

Actions which are taken with the intent of harming
or
thwarting another person are aggressive; such actions
are inherently suspect or at the very least liable
to

condemnation.

However, aggression is an incomplete

moral notion because there are special situations in

which it is acceptable or circumstances which allow
dispensation from its moral sanctions (e.g., aggressive
football player, aggressive businessman, aggression
in self-defense).

Nonetheless, such a concept does

have a moral point, and we cannot violate this point

without special justification or the term is in danger
of losing its sense altogether.

Many other concepts, familiar to the social
sciences, may be characterized as incomplete moral

notions.

Such concepts as self-sufficiency, personal

control, individuation, assertiveness

.

responsibility,

and altruism range in their completeness
but are all.
nonetheless, concepts which describe from
a normative
or moral point of view.
That the moral point of these
terms does not constrain their uses as
forcefully
as

concepts such as good, genocide, or murder
can be
conceded.

We may not say. "yes. it was genocide,
but

was it justifiable genocide," without
violating the

moral point of "genocide" as a concept.

We are, in

making such a statement, liable to being accused of
totally misconstruing the term.

With an incomplete

moral notion such as self-sufficiency we are also constrained by the point of the term.

We may say, "isn't

it a shame how he has become so self-sufficient." but

if we do then the burden of proof is upon us to defend

this use of the term.

We have violated its moral point

An argument could be made for the negative implications
of self-sufficiency in this particular case, "but for

those sharing the concept, it embodies a standard to
be applied unless so defeated"

(Connolly.

1974. p.

31)

If in particular instances we may violate the

point of view embodied in a concept, we may not do so
as a matter of course.

To change the moral point of a

concept is to fundamentally change its meaning, and to

subtract the moral point of view completely
is to
render the concept empty and without
sense.
Such a
concept will fall into disuse. This has
been the fate
of such terms as "spinster," "saving
yourself for mar-

riage," "patriarch," "man of the house,"
"negro," and
others.
Our society has changed in some ways, and the
moral points of view which once helped constitute
these
terms have either changed or were lost; and with
this

these concepts have radically altered their meaning
or have disappeared from common usage altogether.

Essentially Contestable Concepts
All concepts are descriptions from a point of view

and often from a moral or normative point of view.

More-

over, within a complex and changing social fabric the

criteria for applying concepts to concrete events may
be unclear and disputable.

Concepts such as "intimacy,"

"achievement," "competence," "personal control" and "re-

sponsibility" must undergo almost constant adjustments
in their criteria for application as new and unforeseen

situations arise.

And as new criteria arise and estab-

lished criteria change so do the dimensions of meaning
that help constitute the concept.

Intimacy does not

mean today what it did 100 years ago (Gadlin, 1977),
although it still maintains its moral point.

New situa-

tions and circumstances have interceded which required

social adjustments in our way of life and our concept
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of what it is to have a close
relationship.

Although many concepts change and
some even disappear, not all concepts are contestable.
Following the
analyses of W.B. Gallie (1956) and
William Connolly (1974.
certain conditions must be met before
a concept
IS contestable.

p.

10),

1.

The concept must have a moral point.

It must

describe a valued or devalued achievement.
2.

The concept or practice involved must be in-

ternally complex.

That is, its characteriza-

tion must involve reference to several dimensions
3.

.

The criteria for applying the concept must
be relatively open enabling the parties to

integrate even shared rules differently as

new and unforeseen situations arise.
The related concepts of womanhood, "feminine,"
and "femininity" are both contestable and contested in

contemporary America.

Womanhood is a valued achievement

by all the contesting parties.

It is an internally

complex concept with constituent dimensions and criteria
of application which are themselves disputable (e.g..
1+

These two authors discussed "essentially contested concepts" within the context of political science
I have changed the perspective to one of "potential contestability" in order to adapt this idea to a broader
arena of social science.
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self-respect, achievement, equality,
justice, motherhood,
demeanor, etc.).
The debate over the Equal Rights
Amendment, for example, may be viewed
as a contest over the
relationship of equality to justice and
full womanhood.
Those opposing ERA have argued that
legal equality will
undermine -justice" for women as they
conceive them. Conflict over the rights of women to
equal pay for equal work
is a contest about the concept
of an "achieving woman"
and whether the work world will be
considered an appropriate
arena, requiring equal protection under
the law.
The con-

ceptual landscape is changing, and the emerging
"new womanhood" represents an entirely new social
phenomenon, re-

shaping relationships and creating its own
dynamic of
change with every other element of social life.

Other concepts have been contested and expanded in

recent years:

intelligence, racism, and institutional

racism, for example.

But perhaps of more interest here

are contestable concepts that have not been raised to
the level of public dispute.

normative importance.

These are concepts of moral-

They are internally complex.

And

alternative formulations of these notions are not only
possible but evident in isolated subcultures, deviant
subpopulations

,

and some scholarly analyses.

This issue

becomes critically important as we realize that it is
the relative stability of some social concepts which has

made them appear "natural," immutable, and transhis torical
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It is such a misconstrual of
social phenomena which

allows researchers and theoreticions
to apply the tools
of empirical natural sciences.
Understanding social
concepts as fixed, allows us to treat
them as stable
objects.
And, in the end, this empiricist
objectification reinforces the conceptual status
quo for those
phenomena
Social concepts with moral or evaluative
rele-

vance are social concepts with real human
consequences.
They help constitute a way of life.
They are essentially
contestable.

Such moral concepts may only avoid social

dispute to the extent that they remain invisible
or immutable, and are viewed as part of the "natural order"

rather than the social order.

Their evaluative nature

creates the moving force for competing self-interests
to dispute the criteria of application or even the
moral

perspective itself.

But such social disputation may only

occur when the different perspectives and interests can
come to a point of mutually recognized contradiction.
Families, intimate friends and lovers, for example,

inevitably contain within them myths, customs and forms
of interaction which have evaluative or moral significance

The acceptable means of exhibiting affection, anger, sex-

uality, etc., may be established within these small and

bounded relationships.

If they are indeed segregated

from wider societal intrusions they may contain dimensions

that are quite idiosyncratic.

In a society that does

not engage in open discussion of
intimacy and sexuality,
for example, contradictory myths
and conceptions may
be generated within this privacy
and isolation.
There
is little opportunity for these
private moral concepts
to come into recognized
contradiction with other perspectives.
They may remain uncontested concepts.
It
is

only as these domains receive public
light that social
and personal contradictions may be
addressed and moral
concepts disputed.
Those social concepts which most thoroughly
per-

meate a society are perhaps the most difficult
to discern.

Their very ubiquitousness within the domains
of

social intercourse, individual aspiration and institutional structures creates their appearance as part
of
the natural order.

Sampson's analysis (1977) of the

interpenetration of "self-sufficient individualism" and
social scientific theory is, of course, illustrative
of just such a concept in the American social order.

Self-sufficiency, personal control, and individualism
are constitutive of our American ideal and are therefore
the foundation for the ordering of other concepts which

define the ideals of our way of life.

We dispute the

dimensions of mental health but not the centrality of

self-sufficiency at the core of the considered alternatives.

Sex role complementarity pales next to the
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competency and independence of an
androgynous alternative.
In environmental psychology
notions of personal
control create the theoretical order
for evaluating the
adequacy of built environments for human
use (Knight,

Zimring, and Kent, 1976; Altman,
1975; Baron and Mandel,
1975)

Quite "naturally" concepts of "privacy"
dominate

.

the theoretical and empirical literature.

These concepts

have intuitive appeal; that is the measure
of their congruence with prevailing social conceptions.
And, of

course,

to the extent that we discipline these
theories

to closely reflect underlying social ideals
and manage

our research to select "appropriate tests,"
"empirical

verification" will be forthcoming.
Of course, no social order is simple and monothematic.

Even concepts as ubiquitious as self-sufficient

individualism are not universally endorsed.

A moment's

consideration will bring to mind a variety of social
arrangements inconsistent with this ideal (e.g., communal
and Utopian communities, cooperative houses and apartments,
etc.).

But such arrangements are socially deviant, in

some cases illegal (e.g., zoning laws often prohibit

cooperative housing)

,

and always faced with difficulties

both from within and without.

The society is so structured

as to enforce the atomization of individuals and coopera-

tive groups are always challenged by the members' own

difficulty with relinquishing individualistically defined
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aspirations, needs, and desires.

Cooperatives in

America are notoriously short
lived.
Contestable concepts, especially
those that
constitute deep and pervasive commitments
within a
social order, may overpower the
abilities of those
who would dispute them. The communal
and cooperative
movement has had many false starts in
the face of an
American individualistic and competitive
social structure and ethos.
The aspirations of women did not
change
suddenly to form the modern feminist
movement.
History
is filled with instances of women
organizing for change
as in the British and American suffragist
movements.

But when isolated women have attempted to
push the

boundaries of the prevailing conception of womanhood
they often suffered personal doubts, frustrations
and
failure.

Whatever the accomplishments of

as George Sand,

for example,

a

person such

the image of women in 19th

century France did not undergo the fundamental transformations that would allow for the routine acceptance
of literary genius such as hers.

When social concepts

are widely held and especially when they appear to define
"the natural order," these contestable concepts may not

surface as true social dispute.
labels and isolates deviants,

When the social structure

the prerogative of naming

the reality is with the powerful.

Prevailing concepts

of the poor and unemployed (cf. Ryan, 1972), marijuana

users in the 1950's (cf. Becker.
1963). or any other
relatively powerless and isolated
group, may be contestable.
But their position in society
will preclude
anything that could meaningfully be
considered social
dispute.
Under such conditions the concepts
of the
"lazy and shiftless poor" and the
"perverted hop-head"
may persist as realities; deviant
opinions will remain
just that and no more.
The concepts we use in contruing and
constituting
the world are at the center of our social
existence.

Moreover, normative and moral notions embody
the force

of value, aspiration, sanction, and condemnation.

Their

dimensions and criteria of application help define the
shape of the human spirit and the constraints of a
social

way of life.

Because we exist in a complex social world

these concepts and criteria that define our worth and

worthyness may become contested.

To the extent that

evaluative concepts can be viewed as the "natural order,"
so long as we may understand such concepts as competency,

achievement, intelligence, womanhood, control, or indiv-

iduality as immutable, then the social world may remain
static.

When victims of the prevailing moral concepts

can being alternative perspectives into the social arena

and present their contradictions, only then may the forces
of contest and change be engaged.
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The Problematics of a
Social Science

empiricist tradition in social science
has
failed to comprehend the relationship
of our social
concepts and our social way of life.
In light of the
preceding discussion, the idea of an
empiricist social
science loses its sense.
If we understand the essential
contestability of social concepts, then the
scientific
belief in the possibility of "objective
description,"
•nie

"general laws," "prediction," and "empirical
tests of
theory" take on new meaning.
They no longer represent
the canons of discovery.

Rather, they become the rules

for conservative social action.

Such a world view oper-

ates as a force to fix conceptual reality at the
status
quo
The rules for the proper use of our moral
notions, however, are at the same time
rules for what those notions are about;
they are rules for our behavior.
(Kovesi,
Moral Notions, p. 53)
the objectivated world loses its
comprehensibility as a human enterprise
and becomes fixated as a non-human, nonhumanizable, inert facticity.
Typically
the real relationship between man and his
world is reversed in consciousness. Man
the producer of a world, is apprehended
as its product, and the human activity
as an epiphenomenon of non-human processes.
Human meanings are no longer understood
as world producing but as being, in their
turn, products of the "nature of things."
It must be emphasized that reification is
a modality of consciousness, more precisely, a modality of man's objectif ication
of the human world.
Even while apprehending
.

.

.
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[Emphasis added]

Empiricist aspirations are a
hoax that have obscured the essential embededness
of the social scientist
within the phenomena of inquiry.
And to understand
that we are necessarily both
inquirers and participants
in social reality is to
fundamentally change the problematics of the social scientific
enterprise.
If we may
not take the "objective" point
of view then from what
perspective are we viewing phenomena?
If we do not pursue "general laws" then what are
our goals? What replaces
the "empirical test" and the criteria
of "prediction"
as the arbitrer of competing concepts
and theories?

Let us reconsider then some of the
problematics
of a social science.

While the discussion thus far

obviously precludes the possibility of an
objective
and detached science, we may not simply
endorse
the

converse of objectivity.

To say that the concepts we

use in describing social reality help constitute
that

reality is not to claim that reality is no move than its
subjective or intersubjective representations.

We may

not say that social reality is no more than the concepts
we use in describing it.

Human beings can only act toward the
world on the basis of some "understanding,"
but it does not follow from this that
their activity, or the world, possesses
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the character which they
"understand
It to have.
(Lichtman, 1970, p. 92)

Human activities have a relationship
to each other which is an
objective constituent of the world.
These relationships may come to be known,
but thev
are obviously not identical
to any
knowing of them.
(p. 77)
Some philosophers and social
thinkers have come very
close to the completely volunteerist
alternative to

empiricism (e.g.. Winch, 1958; Blumer,
1969; Berger
and Luckmann. 1966).
But if empiricism alienates us
from our generative contributions
to the

social order,

then volunteerism underestimates
significant elements
of the human condition that constrain
social participation and self -consciousness
The concepts of "self-deception,"
"false-conscious-

ness," "repression," and "unconscious" have
persisted
in the lexicon for understanding human
actions because

they continue to offer explanatory power generally
and,
I

believe, because almost all of us at one time or
another

have identified these processes within our own
biographies.
Moreover, if we accept the position that social existence

and subjective conceptions of it perfectly mirror each
other,

then complete understanding of society should be

achievable through close study of its isolated individuals.
The impossibility if not absurdity of such a contention
is

self-evident.

Within the volunteerist position there

is no room for a distinction between "appearance" and
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"reality."

There is no possibility for
deception and
detection, or social illusion
and social structure
(cf. Connolly, 1977).
If such distinctions were
not
central to our social existence
one might wonder at the
persistence of our "queries."
"discoveries," "reforms."
and "mistakes" about social
life.
As I have argued
previously, supporting claims to
the "correct" or "validcharacterization of reality is problematic,
but
at the

same time we may not abandon this
concept completely
without leaping into an abyss of
solypsism or radical

relativism (Lichtman. 1970; Connolly,
1977).
The new problematic for social science
then lies
in our participation in constituting
a social reality

that has real consequences which themselves
are, in
their turn, conceived within our commitments
to a way
of life.

VJe

may not objectify social reality; neither

may we deny that, in part, it stands outside our
subjective understandings of it.

If this understanding of

the problematic is accepted then it is clear that
social

science must establish new aspirations that accept the

impossibility of accruing "facts" through detached observation.

Good Faith Social Science
I

am proposing that the idea of an "objective

and valid" social science be expanded by the broader

imperative of a science in good faith.

The aspiration
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of objectivity through valid
methods would be replaced
by the pursuit of disciplined
self -consciousness
I am
using the term "good faith"
not in the Sartrian sense
of exorcising all self-deception
("mauvaise foi," Being
and Nothingness).
Rather, by good faith I mean to
focus
on the problematics of placing
self-consciousness
.

at the

center of the participant-inquirer
dilemma.
social science then describes

a

in a society and a way of life.

Good faith

form of relationship withIt is the pursuit of self-

consciousness concerning the perspectives
of our concepts,
theories and empirical activities.
But self -consciousness
is not something to be achieved and
reported by individuals
It involves a dialectical relationship
that may be
estab-

lished among good faith participants attempting
to illuminate perspectives and their consequences, and
from
this

form and re-form their way of life.
The central issues for a good faith social science

will reside in our relationships with those we are
studying
and the society of which we are members.

If the reader

has followed the discussion this far, it should be clear
that

I

am arguing that within the theoretical-empirical

enterprise is the negotiation of reality.

And as in any

negotiation the central themes are not only truth and
falsehood but fairness and deception.

I^^:lile

there are

technical and procedural issues involved, at the heart
of the relationship are the human concerns with morality
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and social responsibility.

And the challenge for the

social sciences is to reconsider
the activities and
practices of our discipline within
this imperative.
We
are faced with very basic
questions and dilemmas regarding the social scientific
way of life. The contours
of conceptual meaning and
behavior that help constitute
our relationships constrain and
form the interpretations
of disciplined inquiry.
And the worthiness or validity
of any conceptual point of view
cannot be established or
refuted through simple empirical tests.
The issues are
moral and normative; they reflect
commitments to a way
of life and a position in the social
order.
And because
our concepts are also commitments they
elude simple individual self-reflection and introspection.
The legitimate aspirations for a good
faith social

science must include the elucidation of socially
and

historically generated conceptions and the disciplined
investigation of their constitutive human actions.

Con-

ceptual realities, social actions and scientific inquiry
are all internally related.

Nonetheless,

I

believe that

the development of a self -reflective and critical con-

sciousness within our discipline can begin to establish
a reasoned dynamic to these relations.

Our specific

tasks in this regard may not be defined and set into

mechanical motion.

Rather,

where do we begin?

I

the critical question may be,

believe that within the social

sciences we can effectively
begin this process by
a reconsideration of our
most cherished rituals of
empiricism.
The method and mechanics of
inquiry have
represented a sort of sacrosanct
and holy cookbook
.

results guaranteed.

In succeeding chapters I will

suggest that our methods may be
re-viewed.
Methods
are not only directions for
disciplined inquiry; they
are also the vehicles of our
social perspectives and
commitments.
They may therefore be the most
useful
vehicles for self -reflection. And if
we replace the

dimensions of method within this dialectical
perspective,
perhaps the dynamics of a critically
self-conscious

dialogue may be initiated.

CHAPTER

III

SOCIAL RESEARCH:
METHODS AS ACTIONS

Research methods and the "rules of
competent
inquiry" help constitute the heart
of the empiricist
enterprise.
Research methods are, of course, the
actions
and decisions of investigators, designed
to allow more
systematic consideration of social phenomena.
However,
these canons of scientific investigation,
"reconstructed
logic" in the words of Abraham Kaplan
(1964), are often
understood in formal/ structural terms that tend
to obscure
the role of the researcher as actor and
decision maker.
It is my contention that a simple refocusing,
highlighting

and explicating these dimensions of human action will
allow

important insights into the nature of social scientific

enterprises and the social commitments within which they
operate.

"Statistics," "research methods," and "experimental
design" have been viewed as the first and initiating courses
for any serious student of the social sciences.

Methodo-

logical concerns are, in the empiricist view, the procedures
for valid discovery, hence their central role in science.
As has been aptly pointed out by others, our methods have

preceded our substance (Koch, 1959).
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Research methods
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have been seen as "toolsfor discovery and these
tools have become prior to
and detached from the tool
users.
Research methods and designs
are applied to
"a phenomenon" and a
"subject population." The
correct
application of method is thought
to insure the discovery
or demonstration of
scientifically valid laws.
This conception of research
methods as tools that
exist detached from the researcher
or the researched is
reflected in the language with which
methods are described
It seems that research design
and techniques are seen as
independent entities.
Designs are carefully worked out to
dependable and valid answers to
the research questions epitomized
by
the hypothesis.

y-Leld

How does design acaomplish this? Research design sets up the framework
for adequate tests of the relations
among variables.
Design tells us, in
a sense, what observations to make,
how to make them, and how to analyze
the quantitative representations of the

observations

Finally, an adequate design outlines
possible conclusions to be drawn from
statistical analysis.
(Kerlinger, 1966, p. 276)
[Emphasis added]

This general discussion above is followed by
the description of "poor" and "good" research designs.

Moreover, this abstracted conception of research design
is not unique to Kerlinger but is echoed in most major

research methods texts (e.g., Festinger and Katz, 1953;
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Selltiz et al., 1951; Crano and
Brewer, 1973; Runkel
and McGrath, 1972; and others).
To say that research methods
are detached from

their human users and contexts
is not to deny that there
are a great many controversies
about proper methods of
inquiry.
But of course, these controversies
are themselves understood as disputes over
the rules for scientific discovery.
Debates revolve around abstract and
utilitarian characterizations of the
research enterprise:
where should research be conducted
(laboratory vs field
and naturalistic observation)?, what is
the best form of
resultant data (quantitative vs qualitative
designs,

multivariate vs univariate designs, orthogonal
and nonorthogonal relationships)?, what are the most
powerful
mechanics of research analysis (experimental, correlational,

time series analysis)?

technical and object oriented.

The discourse has remained

We've got a hammer, where

do we pound?; we've got a hammer how can we make
it a

better pounding tool?
The current conceptions of social scientific methods

tend to obscure the fact that research strategies are

constituted by researcher decisions and actions within
a social context.

A social research project is not an

abstract exercise in scientific investigaton

;

it is a

substantive and meaningful relationship between an investigator and the participants in the study.

The obscuring

of this social relationship
between the researcher,
the participants, and the
activities of inquiry stands
as both a fundamental element
of empiricism and a maj,or
I

impediment to self -consciousness
about our roles in the
negotiation of social reality.
If social scientists
are to pursue a self-consciousness
about the scientific
enterprise, the methods of inquiry
must be reconsidered
as researcher actions on and
with particular phenomena
and particular people.
In this chapter,

I

will re-characterize research

methods as the decisions and actions
of researchers.
will focus attention on what social
scientists do to
and with those being studied.

I

My intention is not to

dazzle the reader with startling insight so
much as to
review familiar concepts from a slightly different
point
of view.
Many of the characterizations that follow will
appear obvious upon the naming.

Nonetheless, this analy-

sis will support further consideration of the
scientist's

role in empirical inquiry.

In subsequent chapters re-

searcher actions and decisions will be reconsidered as
the elements from which researcher-participant relation-

ships are built.
a

This perspective will later provide

viewpoint from which to address issues that are largely

ignored by empiricism.

Within the social scientific

way of life, how do our social relations help form and
constrain scientific conclusions?; how do our scientific
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conclusions participate in shaping
the constitution
of social reality.
But first it will be useful
to
focus closer attention on some
dimensions of researcher
action with the subjects of social
inquiry.

Controll ing Antecedent Conditions
The term "antecedent condition"
refers to researcher
defined social or physical conditions
that are thought
to affect human behavior in some way.

Together, "antecedent"

and "consequent" conditions represent
the key concepts of
theoretical models; the hypothesized relationship
between
these two elements is the subject of
empirical study. The

researcher may ask, for example, does "frustration"
(antecedent condition) lead to increased "aggression"

(consequent)

E.P. Willems (1969, p. 46) has defined the
dimension of

controlling antecedent conditions as "the degree of the
investigator's influence upon, or manipulation of antecedent
conditions of behavior."

The act of controlling antecedent

conditions is of course the hallmark of what has come to
be called the experimental paradigm.

Researchers communi-

cate persuasive messages, present carefully designed ex-

perimental tasks, and in general expose "subjects" to highly
controlled and systematically varied sets of "stimulus conditions."

Research strategies in which investigators may

not control antecedent conditions include a wide range of
survey research projects and observational studies.

While

behaviors or verbal reports are carefully measured, the
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researcher has no control over
preceding conditions.
Although these investigators may
sample

across system-

atically defined populations
(socioeconomic levels, education levels, etc.), they do
not control the prior experiences of those they are researching.
The use of systematic researcher
control permeates
well beyond the confines of the
laboratory experiment.
Similarly, exerting control over
antecedent conditions
is not a necessary feature of
experimentation.
The focus
here remains, what the researcher
does, not where research
occurs or what the activity is called.
Participant
ob-

servers,

for example, often include elements
of researcher

control as one tactic for generating
information.

Self-

conscious violation of social rules (Turner,
1974) or
judicious attempts at role consonant behavior
are often

effective for creating or controlling

a

situation in the

interests of generating opportunities to observe
the response of others (McCall and Simmons, 1969; Wheeler,
1978).

Clinical and "depth" interviewers "probe," "assume roles
in the relationship," and utilize a variety of other
tech-

niques of explicit interpersonal control in the interests
of eliciting interpretable responses.

Moreover, it should

be recognized that serendipitous or naturalistic experi-

ments may sometimes be instances of true experiments in
the field,

the conditions occurring outside of the re-

searcher's control.

Social programs instituted by

governmental agencies
6cin_j.es, n3^n•ra^
natural ^-.-^
disasters, or draft
lotteries may offer occasions
of low researcher control
and random assignment of
individuals to experimental
groups (Cook and Campbell,
1975, pp. 116-195).

Researcher control over research
conditions is
an activity that serves the
researchers' own scientific
purposes.
This activity may be referred
to as "experimental control," "role
participation," "role taking" or
any number of other designations.
The controlling relationship is designed to create
systematic variations in
social conditions for the purpose
of researcher theory
testing, and/or to create surrogate
events to stand-in
for difficult to study natural
phenomena (e.g., highly
frustrating situations or infrequent
and private social
role behaviors).
Similarly, investigators may choose
to sample rather than control
antecedent conditions when
this strategy better serves their
theoretical
needs.

Of course, describing and sampling is
no less an action
than directly controlling; it is simply a
different

kind of action.

The investigator characterizes popula-

tions or situations (e.g., ghetto dwellers, high
density
rooms, successful women, etc.) and then observes
some

theoretically relevant behavior of his/her choosing.
Controlling or sampling, researchers must act to define,
manipulate, and/or measure any antecedent conditions relevant to their purposes.

Imposing Units of Measurement

A second dimension of the
researcher's action
and decision concerns the
extent to which

s/he imposes

restrictions on the range or
spectrum of behavioral
responses that will be considered
data.
To what extent
does the investigator determine
or limit the form of
measured and recorded responses.
At the extremes,

social

scientists may limit measured
responses to the check
marks on a preformed scale.
On the other hand, the researcher's use of open and unstructured
interviews may
allow respondents to relate a wide
variety of verbal and
nonverbal information that may later
become part
of the

analyzable data.
VJhen

investigators structure units of measurement

they are assured of detecting predetermined
relevant

information and they are assured of having that
information in the form most useful to them (i.e.,
observations pick-up all relevant dimensions of predefined
be-

havior, measurements are scaled as the researcher
desires)

When investigators avoid imposing units of measurement,
observational information may not occur in expected forms.
Participants may utilize unexpected behavioral and verbal
responses styles.

This may be viewed as relevant and

informative in and of itself.

The point is, both inves-

tigative actions serve to shape the relationship between

researcher and participant and the form of subsequent
data.
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Roger Barker (1969) has
described two types of
relationship between the investigator
and those being
studied.
The psychologist as "operator"
(0 Type Data)
and the psychologist as
"transducer" (T Type Data)
0
Data involves the active
participation of the investigator in regulating input or
affecting the phenomena (controlling antecedent conditions),
followed by the psychologist's "translating" the observed
outcome (imposing
units of measure).
Researchers collecting T
.

Data, on the

other hand, attempt to avoid operations
on the phenomena
and instead concentrate on the
translation,

or coding, of

observed responses.

In both cases, however. Barker
describes

the psychologist as highly involved
in translating, coding,
or imposing units of measurement.
The ethological tradition

has concentrated more attention on this
issue of translating

observed phenomena.

Traditionally, the ethological orien-

tation has stressed the importance of detailed
description

avoiding researcher imposed units of measure in order
to
facilitate the accurate representation of the behavior

observed (Marler and Hamilton, 1966; Schneirla, 1951).
Hutt and Hutt (1970) drew a clear distinction between

"ethological" and "ecological" (Barker, 1965; Wright, 1967)
approaches around this very issue.

Their distinction

clearly highlights the fact that researchers within the
two orientations, who are in agreement about eschewing

control of antecedent conditions, vary in the degree to
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which they see themselves as
imposing observational
units of measurement. From
Hutt and Hutt's point of
view, investigators using
ethological approaches adhere
more strictly to behavioral
description,
at least initially disallowing imposed
categorizations or organization of behaviors (p. 22-25)

Other research traditions have
also emphasized
the implications of using
methods of measurement which
impose a priori restrictions on
the recording of phenomena into data.
Interviewers as well as participant
observers may vary in the degree to
which they impose
units of measure.
The same issue has been considered
by those concerned with the relative
advantages and
limitations of unstructured procedures and
participant
observation (Dean et al., 1969; Vidich and
Shapiro.

1955).

Several authors have pointed out that within
almost any

research project the observer may fluctuate from
less
structured approaches to frequency counts of operationally defined behaviors, in the latter case imposing
categories or units on the stream of behavior (Lofland,
1971;
Becker, 1958).
The methods of Kendon and Ferber (1973) in observing

human greetings may be used as

a

clear example of decisions

to avoid constraining measurement units with a priori

impositions.

After thoroughly documenting the physical

environment, context, and nature of the population under
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study,

these investigators used
film and video-tape
recording to observe the
greeting behavior of some
middle-class adults at a private
outdoor party.
Cameras
were kept at the edges of
the party site.
Guests were
filmed from the time they
approached on the walkway until
they parted from the host
or hostess.
Initially,
the

only restrictions on filmed
observations were the definition of the phenomenon of
interest.
Cameras focused on
greetings from the time the guests
first came within
sight of the host-hostess and
earlier arrivals.
It may
also be noted here that this
research strategy may be
seen as exerting very little
control over antecedent
conditions.
n.e party was a real event.
The investigators had no control over the existing
relationship of
guests to each other, time of arrival,
order of persons
in meeting each other, etc.

Kendon and Ferber's investigative strategy
of
avoiding imposed response categories and
controlled
situations resulted in both gains and losses of
pertinent
information.

Any questions or verbal probes would have

elicited responses partly shaped by the structure of
their questions.

On the other hand, avoiding such im-

positions resulted in the loss of any access to internal
experiences associated with the greeting behaviors that
were the subject of inquiry.

The research paradigm used
by Byrn (1969)
to investigate the
relationship of similarity and
attraction between persons may be
used to illustrate
researcher actions designed to
highly control behavioral antecedents and impose
rigid units of measurement.
Each respondent is given a
short attitude questionnaire on some topic. He/She
is then shown another
copy of this questionnaire,
supposedly completed by
a second individual.
The responses on this second
questionnaire vary in the degree to which
they are "similar"
to the responses of the respondent
(independent variable)

Finally, liking or attraction of the
respondent toward
this hypothetical stranger is measured
by two questions
(How much do you think you would
like/dislike this person? and Would you enjoy/dislike working
with this person?)
The respondent places an "X" on a seven
point
.

scale,

indicating the degree of "attraction" (dependent

variable).

The antecedent condition (similarity of re-

spondent and hypothetical stranger) is under the total
control of the investigator as communicated through the

presented questionnaire responses.

Likewise, the inves-

tigator imposes rigid units of measurement, allowing

participants to express "attraction," but only within
the structure of their answers to two scaled question-

naire items.
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Of course, researrhp-rc
j-ej>earcners i-u^-tthat impose units of
•

,

measurement may utilize sampling
rather than control
of antecedent conditions
in forming their investigative strategies.
For example, Byrn's
procedures may
be contrasted with other
research cited by him
con-

cerning the same theoretical
issues.

Several researchers

measured the attitudes and
personality traits of married
couples and friends in an attempt
to
assess the degree

to which these persons

(presumably attracted to each

other) were similar on these
dimensions (Schiller, 1932;
Kirkpatrick and Stone, 1935; Schooley,
1951; Richardson,
1940).
The measured variable, similarity,
was once again
obtained by imposing limitations on the
participants'

response style.

Each completed a set of scaled question-

naires (high imposition of units).

On the other hand,

the investigators had no control over
the antecedent

conditions of attraction in the relationships.

Controlling antecedent conditions and imposing
units of measurement are two independent
dimensions
of researcher action in relationship with
participants.

Moreover, decisions and choices along these dimensions
of control and measurement shape the information available for subsequent analysis.

One way or the other

the investigator must act, and the consequences of his/

her actions will help define the relationship with participants,

the shape of resultant data, and therefore

the range of rational
interpretations available.

Conceali ng the Invps^-i
intentions

p.^.-..^

~

There is by this time a
rather extensive literature concerning the reactivity
of persons to being
observed, measurement as a
change agent, evaluation
apprehension and related topics
(Orne, 1962; Rosenberg,
1969; Rosenzweig, 1933; Campbell
and Stanley, 1963; Cook
and Campbell, 1975; Argyris,
1968; and others).
Scientists have concentrated much
attention on "subject reactivity" as a threat to "veridical
scientific investigation." Their approaches have
varied depending on orientation, beliefs, assumptions,
judgments and the particular
objectives of the researchers carrying
out the project.
It is important to note however
that their concerns have
focused on creating the "correct" and
"effective" methods
of empirical investigation.
Without referring to "validity
issues" or "subject reactivity" it is still
possible to

characterize researcher relationships with
respondents
by the extent to which the research enterprise
is made
explicit and salient to those participating.

To what

extent does the investigator disguise, hide, or
submerge
the agendas, intentions and objectives of his/her
relationship with respondents.

Discussions of "unobtrusiveness" in research have

been concerned, in general, with strategies for lowering
the saliency of "observation," "investigation," and

"theoretical hypotheses" within
the researcher-participant relationship. Webb
et al. (1966) discussed
this
in terms of removing
the instruments of
observation from
the participants' view.
The hidden camera, hidden
counter
or natural archival study
would be examples of such
a

tactical approach.

This orientation represents
the most
common understanding of
unobtrusiveness
These same
concerns have been reflected
in the common researcher
strategy of "deception" and
concealment of hypotheses
in social psychological
experimentation (Foreward, et al.,
1976)
While the participants often
know they are in
.

.

a psychological experiment,
complex procedures and "cover

stories" are used to obscure the
purposes and hypotheses
of the sttidy.
It is, of course, equally
true of many
participant observers that they do
not disclose all their
intentions or preliminary hypotheses
to those being studied.
Similarly, survey researchers and
interviewers will maintain an openness about individual
questions while concealing
broader research intentions, theoretical
perspectives
and

hypotheses
Of course, concealing research goals and
intentions

from participants is a two-edged sword.

VThile researchers

may gain some assurance of "noncontamination" (e.g.,
ignorance of researchers' hypotheses and expected results),

concealment is also recognized as alienating the researcher
from the perceptions, beliefs and intentions of those
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being studied.

Participant observers will often
reveal
the full nature of their
research enterprise to selected
informants in the interests of
eliciting useful and
unexpectedly pertinent information.
Recently, social
psychologists have shown renewed interest
in role-playing
techniques as a means of gaining more
insight into social
phenomena.
These techniques often include
relatively
full explicitness about research
interests and agendas
(e.g., Mixon, 1971; Baron,
1976).
Mixon,
for example,

asked participants to engage with him
in a role playing
replication of the classic Milgram (1963)
obedience study.

Each person played all roles (subject,
learner, experimenter, and bystander).

Through eliciting self-reflections

on personal experience and systematically varying
elements

of each role, he was able to shed new light on the
inter-

pretation and human meaning of the "obedience" phenomenon
as it was originally reported by Milgram.

Both concealing and nonconcealing researcher strategies constitute decision/actions that shape relationships

and constrain subsequent conclusions.

Concealment tends

to alienate the researcher from participants' phenomenal

experiences and interpretations of the situations observed
or constructed by the investigator.

Revealing intention

and theoretical objectives raises questions about participants' motives of self -presentation

,

and their compliance/

resistance vis a vis the researchers' favored hypotheses.
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Once again, it is clear that
researchers must act. and
at the same time any
actions on their part serve
to
shape and constrain conclusions
and interpretations.

Control ling Research Contexts

Researchers may not only act to
control the forms
of observation/measurement and
the introduction

of ante-

cedent events, but also some
elements of the context or
milieu within which these research
relationships are
pursued.
To what extent does the
researcher control or
on the other hand describe the
physical and social backdrop for the investigation of the
focal theoretical issues
Who creates the circumstances within
which data are collected? ^Who controls the dimensions
of legitimate activity,

the researcher or the participants?

The classic lab-

oratory study represents an attempt by the
investigator
to manipulate theoretical variables,
measurement pro-

cedures and the surrounding context of the
research relationship.

The subject engages in the researcher's tasks,

responds to the researcher's questions within the researcher's controlled domain, designed to serve only the

purposes of the researcher.

Field experimenters may

control research variables of interest and the form of

observations while allowing the surrounding context to
continue unperturbed.

Sherif and his colleagues (1961)

for example, took advantage of the routines at a boys'

summer camp to systematically intervene in games and

camp tasks and observe
the consequent
patterns of
cooperation and competition
among the campers.
However
they did not control the
surrounding context of the
summer camp experience.
The researchers'
enterprise
was embedded within a
context defined by others
and
serving to achieve other
purposes.

Popular mythology within
the social scientific
community has muddled the
discussion of context. Field
research (a category typically
used for discussions of
contextual issues in research)
has been discussed and/or
endorsed by numerous authors
making a variety
of points:

Brunswik (1955) representative
design; Barker (1965)
and Wright (1967) ecological
psychology; Weick (1968)
systematic observational methods;
Sanford (1970) action
research; McGuire (1967, 1973)
changing orientations in
social psychology, just to mention
a few.
Such a state
of affairs could easily confuse the
concept
as it is

defined here.

Contextual control refers to the activitie

and choices of a researcher which are
designed to control
the milieu within which he/she focuses
on behavioral

variables of theoretical interest.
above,

As I have implied

the decision to control the research context
is

independent of decisions about controlling theoretically
defined antecedent variables or the extent to which

measurement units are imposed by the investigator.

The

laboratory investigator creates a controlled context in

order to establish
"uncontaminated" and "simplifiedsurroundings within which
to manipulate and
measure behaviors of interest. Other
researchers (such as Sherlf
et al., in the Robbers
Cave Experiment, or social
pro-

gram evaluators, Campbell,
1969) may control chosen
conditions but measure "effects"
.ithU uncontrolled contexts that serve purposes
other than
those of the re-

searcher (boys camps are for
fun, and participants in
social programs are pursuing
their own
lives not the

interests of science)
The distinction between
"theoretical variables"
and "context" in social research
is determined by the

researcher's perceptions of "figure
and ground."

And

in the same way that the well-known
visual illusion may
shift from "vase" to "human profiles"
depending on how
you look at it, "theoretical variables"
and "context"

may reverse themselves depending on
the researcher's
point of view.
This is of course true whether the
researcher chooses to control or describe
the
context

which surrounds the theoretical phenomenon.

For many

years the "experimenter" was simply part of
the context

("Procedures were carried out" as the studies often
read) of social psychological experiments.

By focusing

on the experimenter and "experimenter effects,"
Rosenthal
(1966) and others reversed the perceptual field such

that the experimenter was considered a "critical variable."

This figure-ground reversal
created reverberating
effects within the field
permanently altering the way
researchers discuss, conduct
and report experimental
studies.
In a similar fashion, the
current rhetorical
vogue advocating emphasis on
social psychological research with more representative
populations was at
least partially a result of
increasing concerns that
the use of college sophomores
in research was not simply
contextual background but perhaps
a critical determinant
of research results. All social
researchers act to
define focal phenomena and explanatory
concepts as distinct from surrounding contexts.
Empirical researchers,

with Hhese perceptual frames in mind,
conduct their research relationships through controlling

and/or describing

their conceptions of the contextual
surrounding vis a vis
their chosen theoretical phenomena.

Defining the Rules by Which
Phenomena Are Translated
~"
Into Data
From the researcher's perspective the empirical

investigation is an exercise in structured observation
for the purpose of generating information.

Verbal

description and physical procedures that clearly define
concepts and actions allow the researcher's experiences
to become publicly accessible and interpretable

.

Like

anyone else, scientists are most clearly understood when
they can communicate the meaning of their concepts,
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definitions and perceptions with
as little ambiguity
as possible.
There are a variety of
researcher strategies for establishing clear
definitions in empirical
research.
All of these may be understood
as various
ways of defining the rules and
procedures by which
phenomena are conceptualized and
translated
into data.

Operational description, as a strategy
for empirical definition, while rarely
used in its pure form, still
enjoys wide acceptance among social
scientists as a
standard of aspiration.
Concepts must be defined utilizing discretely observable behaviors
and explicit rules
of combination (e.g., certain behaviors
are defined as
"aggressive," the more of these behaviors
that occur
[summative combinatorial rule] the higher
the person is
in "aggressiveness")

.

High amounts of palmer sweating

and skin conductivity (GSR), for example,
may be defined
as data indicating that a person is
physiologically

"aroused."

However, behind this definition are the rules

for translating the phenomena (palmer sweating)
into data
(GSR measures)

.

The rules in this case are constituted

by the description of the electronic measuring instru-

ment and the procedures for its proper use.

Knowing the

rules (the equipment specifications and procedures) any

investigator wishing to use the same operational definition of "arousal" (palmer sweating and GSR) could be

assured that s/he is considering the same empirical

concept and phenomenon as
the first researcher.
A
concept is empirically
defined solely through
the
operational rules for translating
the phenomenon into
data.
Other examples of the
operationalis t approach
may clarify this point:
attitudes are defined as individuals' scores on properly
constructed attitude
scales; intelligence is an
individual's score on a
properly constructed
("reliable" and "valid") intelligence test. And the rules
of "proper construction"
are
defined in terms of standard
attitude scaling and psychometric procedures. As an
ideal there are clearly
prescribed procedures and actions
(reliability
tests,

item stability checks,
predictive validity tests, convergent validity tests, and so
on) that constitute the
rules for translating (scale
construction) these phenomena into "data."

While operational description is still
a common
aspiration, in practice many social
scientists
use

definitional strategies that are a good deal
less
explicit and rigidly constructed. The two
major categories may be characterized as intuitive and
intro-

spective descriptions.
Kaplan (1964) defines intuition as "(1) preconscious, and (2) outside the inference schema for
which

we have readily available reconstructions"

(p.

14)

While intuitive description is based on observables,
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although perhaps less well
explicated than in the
operationalist strategy, the
rules for combining observables to define a construct
are left undescribed
or
loosely described. Wright
(1967) emphasizes that definitions and descriptions
in this model rely on
"everyday knowledge and perception"
(pp. 24-25), common sense.
He cites an example which
may clarify the distinction
between operationalism and
what I am calling intuition.
From Wright's point of view
this record is incomplete:

chin

^"""8 "P"^''<^ through an
i^^^
'^^Srees and landed on Henry's

He suggests this as a better
record:

John hit Henry with apparent
intent
to hurt him.
The basis of intuitive description
is clearly within

publicly observable behaviors.

But the observer might

be hard pressed to describe the
rules by which the

construct "intent to hurt" was intuited.
a non-public,

This represents

unexplicated process of translation.

Winch (1958) offers a similar example in
describing
a cat which is seriously hurt.
We say the cat "writhes" about.
Suppose
I describe his very complex movements
in purely mechanical terms, using a set
of space-time coordinates.
This is, in
a sense, a description of what is going
on as much as is the statement that the
cat is writhing in pain.
But one statement could not be substituted for the
other.
The statement which includes the
concept of writhing says something which
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no statement of the
other sort hr.r.
ever detailed, could
ap;rox?Lte ?r
writhing belongs to
rau??^.?^/^
^^"^^^^t framework from that
of^^hl
t in teSs
of ZlclTlT'
or
space-time coordinates,
(p. 73-74)
"Writhing., is an intuitive
statement, based on observable events but going
beyond these events through
inference rules that are
difficult if not impossible
to explicate.
"

Introspective description
refers to use of the
observer's subjective experiences
as sources of data.
These experiences are. of
course, not publicly observable and the rules for their
construction relatively
unaccessible.
Perhaps the clearest example
of the use

of .private experience is the
clinician's attention to
his/her feelings toward a client
at a particular time
as information about what
the client is expressing.
Such
references are common in case study
reports.
Introspection
also appears as one of the strongest
arguments for participant observation as a rich data
collection strategy.
Perhaps the greatest contribution
of this method for

social science is its emphasis on the
significant data
obtainable by observers attending to their
own responses
in the participant role (McCall and
Simmons,

1971).

1969; Lofland,

For example, Howard Becker (1963), in his
study

of jazz musicians, had inside information,
special knowledge

unattainable except for his experience as
in that group.

a

participant

This information was not publicly available

.

and the rules by which
^
y Which he constructed
perceptions were
inexplicit
social scientists .ay
choose to use
operationalist
intuitive and/or
introspective strategies
for defining
concepts, Behaviors and
activities within the
empirical
investigation. Donald
Campbell (1974) has
argued that
even highly structured
laboratory research,
ostensibly
"lying only on operational
rules for definition
contains significant
elements of the intuitive
process.
And
Ukewise, participant
observation reasearch ™ay
so^eti.es
rely heavily on operational
definitions .ore suitable
for quantifiable analysis
(Becker. 1969).
But one way
or the other, "description"
„ust involve both a phenomenal event and some action
by the investigator.
The
investigator must set the rules
by which these phenomena
Will be translated into
data.

'

_

The empiricist perspective
constructs an understanding
of the research enterprise
and the dimensions of social
scientific activity within its
own framework of aspirations:
"accurate description," "valid
conclusions" and
"universal laws." These aspirations
and the consequent
construal of research activity as
"the logic of discoveryhave tended to deemphasize the human
decisions and actions
that constitute the investigative
endeavor.
The purposes
of this chapter have been to reorient
attention to de-

cision making and actions that occur when
researchers inter-

^hese actions the
in.esUg.tor shapes
.he structure
and form of his/her
re]p^-^^«
urelationship
with the subjects
of
empirical inquiry.
^'^^"^'^

P"^--^^

<Chapter II) that social
sc^ence is necessariX,
the stud, of hoth
social concepts
and social behavior.
Moreover, social
concepts arise
out of relationships
a.ong people.
Social inquir, is
'

.

relationships.

This definition of
social science and
social reality is of
course circular; and
that is precisely the dilen»,a of
the hu^an condition.
Our understanding of ourselves
is largely constituted
by who we
'are and the for. of
our hu^an relationships.
If social
scientists wish to pursue
inquiry into the forms of
social phenomena then they
must come to grips with
the
implications of their own active
participation.

would like to argue that as
social scientists
we constrain our perceptions
through
I

our social per-

spectives and that these constraints
are manifest in
the way we Interact with
those we study.
Researcher
actions and decisions within
empirical investigations
shape research relationships and
therefore the scientific conclusions that emerge from
them.
Through the

institutions of social science, research
reports, popular science, applied research and
consultation, social

scientists particiDfl^^=
mcipate
P

m
i-n

t-u^
the

t

larger social drama.

That
our social perspectivpq
peccives i-nfr^^rr,
inform our participation
y
in
the constitution of the
Lne same social
<?oo-?oi
reality that is the
object of our inquiry.
is,

\

CHAPTER
RELATIONSHIPS,

COMON

IV

SENSE. AND USEFULNESS

When researchers .ake
scientific decisions and
engage in investigative
actions they necessarily
shape a
particular relationship with
those who
are the subjects

of their inquiry.

And because this „ust
be true
the
empirical enterprise cannot
be fully understood
without
considering the implications
of these researcher
actions
and relationships.
Research methods are indeed
more than
mere "tools" for discovery.
They are researcher actions
within a relationship with
those being researched.
And
a refocusing on these
relationships and their implications for social science begins
to clarify new aspirations
for an empirical enterprise
without empiricism.
To say that social scientific
research is consti-

tuted by researcher actions in
relationship with those
researched is not in itself a criticism
of the endeavor.
Rather, by highlighting scientist
participation in the

empirical enterprise

I

am simply proposing that social

scientific methods cannot separate the
social scientist
from human relationships and human
responsibility. Like
all other human activities empirical
research and social
theory are participatory, collective and social
undertakings.

By drawing out the dimensions and implications
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of our research
relationships, it „ay
be possible
to engage in them
.ore self-consciously,
and more
reflectively.
so doing, social
science will have
to relinquish its
position as the priesthood
of facts
As an alternative,
however, social scientists
may begin
to form another
relationship of social
responsibility
and social participation
in good faith.

m

The following discussion
will consider the actions
which Shape empirical
relationships as forms of
constraint
on the social reality
that may be understood
within them.
It will be argued that
these relat.ionships
necessarily
manifest fundamental social
perspectives, and often these
perspectives are implicated in
a social and normative
way of life. The ways in
which empirical research relationships are constrained will
be viewed as a manifestation of the way the researcher
implicitly construes
social reality.
The way in which social
existence is
understood helps define the boundaries
of social living,
the alternatives within conflicts,
the shape of options
and opportunities, and the rules
for success and failure,
normality and deviance. The social
perspectives and the
social reality that constrains the
research relationships
also constrains the potential uses of
subsequent researcher
conclusions, theories, and "facts." It is
then pertinent
to ask, what kind of relationship is
occurring in the

research activity?

What is the role of control and com-

Pliance. selection and
acceptance? what is the
role
of concealed intentions
in social scientific
inquiry ?
And finally, when
researchers "make sense."
"name th_e
reality." of empirical
relationships, who's "sense"
is
this, who's "reality."
and within which way of
life?

Researcher Actions and
Relationships:
Control ^iSd^iTg^^,-

A reconsideration of the
dimensions of researcher
action casts new light on
some old and rather tired
dichotomies.
Characterizations such as behavioral
vs
phenomenal, experimental vs
qualitative, laboratory vs
naturalistic and others have been
batted about as alternative strategies for competent
investigation
of social

phenomena.

They have been debated for
their utility in
gleaning the "facts" from a complex
stream of social
behavior. While it is clear that
the presumptions of
such controversies are misguided,
there are important
distinctions within these debates and the
distinctions
roughly correspond to two modes of
action used by researchers as they shape their relationships
within the

empirical inquiry:

control and selection.

Elements of researaher control are easily enough
recognized.

For the purest cases, the laboratory ex-

periment is brought to mind.

Highly controlled stimuli

are presented to participants (controlling antecedent

conditions) and the responses are measured by structured
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task perfonn^nces
or rating scales
(imposing units
Of measurement).
The experiment
takes place within
a researcher
controlled setting
(controlling contexts)
and responses are
operationally defined,
precisely and
mathematically constructed,
according to rules chosen
by the researcher
(operational definitions)
There are
of course, elements
of selection involved as
well.
The"
researcher chooses to selpo^
i
^
select randomly from a
population
of college students,
married couples, local gay
co™,unit-s, U.S. citizens, and so
on depending on the
researchers'
theoretical interests.
.

A somewhat different
approach corresponds to research strategies often
described as ethnographic,
participant-observation or qualitative
techniques.
The researcher will join with those
being observed in an ongoing setting, controlling
neither antecedents nor contexts.
The investigation may describe
"causes" and contexts as
they are described by participants,
using their units of
measurement and utilizing their
explicit and/or inexplicit
intuitive and subjective styles
of combining information
about experiences.
But here too the researcher .elects
and samples a population of his or
her own definition
(e.g., neurotic clients, young
medical interns, jazz musicians, aggressive individuals, etc.)

according to parti-

cular chosen theoretical interests.

One way or another,
of course,
acts, decides and
participates

tionship.

the researcher

in the research
rela-

Ml

empirical inquiries
contain elements of
researcher control and/or
selection
varying degress
The debates over which
strategies are ^ost
effective
tend to „elt into
irrelevance, however,
as one considers
the character of me
the r&l
ai-i r^r^c^w
relationships
that follow from
these scientific actions
and decisions.

m

I^iements of Control and

55EIrIIissioHaO^

.Sp

I

.

Research relationships in
which the researcher
exerts control can only
proceed smoothly to the
extent
that the participants are
willing to cooperate. Highly
controlled relationships are
relationships of asymetric
power and compliance.
Subjects must be willing to
attend
to the researcher's
stimuli, accept the researcher's
tasks, and express themselves
through the categories
and units presented by the
researcher. When researchers
enter into relationships in which
they hold the power of
control, and when participants
cooperate and
comply, then

we may say that they are engaged
in a legitimate professional relationship.

Elements of professionalism have been
recognized
by others as inherent forms of relationship
in experimental research.
Ingle (1977) offered a persuasive

review pulling- together the dimensions of
"professionalism"

and "legitimate
power."

interviews with
prospective
experimental subjects
have indicated that
they expect
experimenters to display
competence, efficiency
and
concern for the subjectsphysical and psychological
well-being, making sure
not to embarrass,
harm, or
disrespect them (Epstein
et iJ..,
c u ,
al
197,. Schulman
LS/j;
and
Berman, 1975).

p:?en^^ro?e^li-a^•^'-|

^-''^

"^"-^

- pSuns,

of"?hese T^T,llisToT,re%tlt,,
be competent in his
field, to respect

n%

f ff;Jnc-mp-^e1c°"

cates t'hat'^h

ll^''

vfo^L^respect, he ?ndi-

(Ep'sL^:;%'t^l^/[;75^1^^2iir^'^°p'^^"^

•

Epstein et al.'s understanding
of the experimental relationship as a "professional"
relationship is based on
well-known concepts of "legitimate
power." Professionals
and researchers as a case in
point, derive their legitimate power from broad cultural
value which give "experts"
and "specialists" the right to
influence others within
prescribed contexts (Collins and
Raven, 1969; French and
Raven,

1959;

Ingle, 1977).

In order for the researcher to
establish a legiti-

mate professional relationship s/he
must be recognized
as a legitimate professional and
an expert with

certain

.

privileges.

Moreover, the research
relationship

tends to breakdo™ If,

(i)

subjects do not recognize

the legitimacy of tne
the relan
urelationship
y
at the outset
(2) the researcher is

or

'

perceived as having
violated
the bounds of
professionalism through
incompetence
or disrespect of the
participant.
That is to say in
order for the researcher
to successfully
establish a
relationship of control and
professionalism, s/he must
eeleat participants from
a population of
indivduals who
will compl;, because they
are willing to recognize
the

legitimacy of the relationship
and perceive the tasks
and forms or
of interaction
intera^•^^
as competent, respectful,
and
reasonable
/-.t^

It is instructive to
consider the elements of re-

searcher control and
professionalism, and participants'
compliance as relationships of
tacit agreement.
When
highly controlled research
goes well, all parties agree
to interact within
a particular relationship
and set

of constructs.

They have agreed that the
relationships

and constructs do not seriously
violate propriety or the
mutual sense of reasonableness and
common sense.
This
agreement and shared point of view
constitutes the basis
of their professional relationship and
the shape of resultant empirical results.
The necessary correspondence

between researcher and participant points of
view in
controlled research is easily illustrated through con-

sideration of tacit
agreements and "error
variance"
some typical experimental
work.

m

Consider a typical
experiment, concerned with
human responses to noxious
experiences under varying
conditions of avoidability
and information about
its
onset.
More generally, it was
an experiment addressing
.ssues of behavioral
response under varying
conditions
of respondent control.
Briefly, as subjects
awaited an electric
shock, not knowing when
it would occur
they were free to switch
between two channels of a back and forth
tape recorder
One channel provided a
warning signal
before the shock wal to^ccurthl other
n'if" channel
the
provided only backsubjects chose to lisfeHo/l^^'"ten tor the warning signal
they could
press a button upon hearing
it, and perhaps avoid the electric shock
The
fectiveness of the avoidance responseeftrifls, being either 100%,
1977,°p^°^°96^'^''^^•
al
:

The researcher instructed each
subject that they
might control the shocks by attending
to the tone and
pressing an avoidance response button.
The research

questions concerned the amount of time
that subjects
would listen to the tone (rather than
irrelevant music)

thereby increasing their chances of controlling
shocks
through their vigilance to the warning signal.
The researchers, in controlling and shaping the

experimental tasks, created a situation in which subjects' potential control over shocks varied from 0% to
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100% if they pushed the
avoidance button.
the researchers in.Uea
tHe

su.Je.u

tHeir oontrol over shocks.

to so

That is

oonstrue

But this is not the
only

way to understand the
situation.

This perspective

directs attention to the
probability of shocU^^ as
the
focus of defined control.
if fe„er shocks
occur subsequent to avoidance
responses then that
constitutes
potential control.
However, this situation
could
be considered to be one
in which the relevant
referent
was not only the probability
of shock but also the
research relationship in a
larger context.
That is, the
experimenter allowed the subjects
certain probabilities
of shock if the avoidance
button were pushed, and the
experimenter could change or
withdraw that condition.
The experimenter, rather
than the established shock
probabilities, could quite reasonably
be considered
the focus of any definition
of control in this situation.
It is clear that anyone so
construing the experimental situation would, having
already agreed to participate, perceive little meaningful
variability in his/her
potential for control. The experimenter
maintained control and the designated probability
of shocks would be

considered relatively trivial in comparison
to this
one overriding fact.
The entire experiment was based on a shared
point

of view, that researcher bestowed "control^^ and

a

focus

on Shock probability
constituted a sensible
do.ain
of control. Without
that tacit agreement
the meticulously varied experimental
conditions had no sense
It xs interesting
to note in this
regard that most
subjects utilized very
instrumental and vigilant
coping styles, attending
to the warning
tones and
doing so more frequnetly
as the effectiveness
of the
avoidance button was
increased by the experimenter
from 0% to 100% effective.
However. 15 of the 80
subjects showed very
inconsistent attention to the
warning tone, for example,
attending when there was
0% or 337o effectiveness in avoidance
attempts then

not attending when the
avoidance button was 100%
effective.
Post-experimental interviews revealed
that,

Some of these subjects
evidently were
trying to demonstrate their
over the entire situation by control
doing
what was counterintuitive.
Others
switched coping strategies for
the
sake of variety, or in order
to test
the stated probabilities.
(Averill
et al., 1977, p. 411)

These "inconsistent" subjects were
considered "error
varience" in this research, that is
their behavior
was unexplainable.
It is quite possible that these

participants were those for whom the researchers

'

cept of "control" was not sensible or meaningful.

con-

They

looked at this relationship and perhaps other
"control"

relevant relationships in their lives from another point
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or^ view.
.

There are several
important points to be
.ade
about this particular
experiment and others
like it
First, it is quite
competent and well
done within the
empiricist perspective.
fact, the authors
were unusual in their attention
even to those who
constituted
the "inconsistent
"
resnonder<!
«i.ponaers,
recognizing that something more than "error"
or "random" variability
might
be operating.
it is most important
to note the fundamental role of the
relationship between the
researcher
and researched in
constituting the outcome
of the study
They were in agreement
(on the whole) about
the legitimacy
of the relationship
(researcher control) and on

m

•

•

the

.

sensibleness of the implicit
definition of control represented by the task. Without
this agreement the participants' responses degenerated
into "inconsistency" or
"randomness," Moreover, the
alternative concept of control, outlined above, that
focuses on the experimentersubject relationship and a wider
contextual definition
of control cannot be studied
within researcher-controlled
empirical strategies. The relationship
within the setting
constrained the conclusions, viewing
one perspective on
control and its constitutive behavioral
implications while
being totally blind to alternative
conceptions.
It Is

also important to recognize that it is only
within

a

social

population where the experimenters' concepts represent

.

con^on sense for the
majority that the
professional
relationship that legitimates
control can be maintained
For most, this task
seemed not so outrageous
as to imply
xncompetence or disrespect.
Compliance with the experimenter would therefore
seem reasonable.
H.. the minority
resistence to a familiar
form of nonsense simply
elicited'
a passive participation
and tolerance.
It is not necessary
to restrict examples
of re-

searcher control and
professional relationship to
the
extreme cases of experimental
procedures in order to
illustrate inherent constraints
or empirical outcomes.
A recent article by Rubin
and Mitchell (1976) focused
explicitly on "Couples Research
as Couples Counseling."
Although their research only
exerted control through
posing researcher-selected
questions and scaled-response
options (imposing units of
measurement), subsequent
reports revealed strong effects
as a result

of their
inquiries within a legitimate
professional relationship.
Couples responded in a number of
ways to the researchers'
questions.
Nearly 50% of those randomly sampled
stated
that answering the questionnaire had
affected their
relationship with their partner in one way or
another.
Nearly 50% claimed no effects from their
participation,

and a minority expressed offense at the form
of the

questions

.

According to Rubin and
Mitchell's data the
participants reported that
the questionnaire
the
issues raised in it,
and the l:nplicit
definitions
-Plied by a list of .'important
issues" affected both
the participants
"process of definition"
and "dis-

closure" within couples.
f
»

That
inat IS i-r.
.
to say,
many couples

took the researchers'
concepts of intimacy seriously
enough to prompt personal
redefinition, discussion and
disclosure

Consider the role of
legitimate professionalism
and compliance in shaping
any conclusions from their
research.
lor those who felt
their relationships were
unaffected by answering the
questionnaire it may be
assumed that the implicit
definitions contained within
the questions were already
shared (e.g., issues of
equality and relative expectations
within
couples) as

common-sensical, relevant and important
to intimacy.
On the other hand, a minority
were offended by

the form and possibly the substance
of the questions.
I am no longer able to
place or
determine statistical variances
on my emotional relationships.
Please don't bother me. (p. 22)

And, of course, aside from those who
explicitly

expressed offense, others may be contained within
the
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of women and 25% of the men who refused to

respond to follow-up questionnaires.

In the middle,
between those who found
the
questionnaire to operate
within

con^on sense and

reasonableness and those who
were offended and felt
degraded, were a large
group who had not initially
construed intimacy in the
ways it was understood
in
the questionnaire.
They were, however, willing
to

alter their definitions,
engage in more disclosure,
and ultimately reshape
their personal relationship
as a consequence of
exposure to the researchers'

questions and concepts.
concpn^c!

c^rr.^
Some
typical comments by
•

-i

respondents clearly reflect the
power of asking questions within a legitimate
professional relationship.
I had to think about
each inherently
cryptic question.
(p. 24)
some of the questions were
really soul searching.
(p. 19)
.

.

.

Your study did bring out a difference
our outlooks which proved
more important than I had realized

m

at the time.

(p.

21)

Perhaps you might consider opening

a course on this idea for couples
planning marriage.
It would give
you a good idea of yourself, your

compatibility with your partner,
and plans for working together on
each of your needs and finding your
goals.
(p. 25)
It seems clear that the results of this survey

were necessarily constrained by the legitimacy of the
relationship between the researchers and the respondents
The findings reflect "facts" about couples who either
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Shared the researchers
perspectives on l„ti„ac,
or
were willing to respond
to researcher
expertness on
the issues by redefining
their o™ concepts
of relevant issues, dimensions
of intimacy and the
importance
of self -disclosure.
Those who found the
implicit concepts of Intimacy
personally demeaning
either rejected
the legitimacy of the
researcher actively or
passively
through non-response.
The processes of
researcher control and legitimacy, and
selection of respondents
who
would recognize and respond
within this context necessarily constrained any
"facts" that could result
from the
research.
Once again the form of
the research relationship, the actions by the
researchers and the perceived
legitimacy of the relationship,
constituted the constraints on resultant conclusions
about the "nature" of
intimate relationships.

Researchers may exert various forms
of control
over participants to the extent
that they can maintain
their positions as legitimate
professionals. And maintaining this legitimacy depends on
mutual agreements
with the subjects of inquiry that they
have acted with
competence, reasonableness and personal
respect.
Research
conclusions within such a relationship are
inherently

constrained by mutual concepts of legitimacy,
competence,
common-sense, and propriety.

It is the general misappre-

hension of these mutually constitutive relationships within

empirical reality that
has allowed researchers
to remain unaware of their
own actions in
conversing and
shaping existing social
constructs.
But, of course
researcher relationships
are not only constrained
in
the acts of control
described above. Alternatively
conceived, non-controlling
research relationships contain within them the odiiie
same DotenM'^i
potential ^r.
for unrecognized
researcher action.

Elements of Selection and
Acc eptance:
Peer Re 1 p FTTTr.
R)r a

variety of reasons some
social scientists
have turned away from
controlled research and toward
methods variously described as
ethnology, participant
observation, or qualitative
observation.
Typically
they choose research relationships
that avoid

controlling
situations and possible antecedents
to behavior, avoid
controlling contexts within which
observations are made,
and attempt to describe using the
same units of measurement and intuitive-subjective concepts
that are used by
those that are the subjects of the
inquiry.
To the ex-

tent that research strategies may be
characterized in
this way it may be said that the
researcher and parti-

cipants are involved in a relationship of
legitimacy

through acceptance, a relationship of peers.

The re-

searcher is attempting to join the subjects of inquiry
to see the world and social experience through
their eyes
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And the research can
only proceed within
this relationship to the extent
that the observer
assumes the
perspectives and points of
view of those observed
and
in son,e respects is
accepted as an insider
within their
way of life.
The principle mode of
researcher action within
this strategy resides
in the selection of the
subjects
of inquiry.
It is self-evident that
in order to participate and join in a way of
construing the social world
the researcher must select
and define a social aggregate that is understood to
be an internally coherent
entity.
However, simply referring to
this researcher

action as "selection," does not
do justice to the complexity of such an act and the
ways in which selection
is both characterization and
description.
In any but the most isolated
societies individuals

can be characterized, and do in
fact characterize themselves, in a variety of different ways.
Individuals
who may be doctors, are also citizens,
children, consumers,
democrats. Black Americans, stockholders. New
Yorkers,

veterans, lovers, and so on.

To select a group of "doc-

tors" or "consumers" is an act of characterization
by the

researcher.

And this act will constrain and define what

it means to "join" and assume the perspective
of that

social group.

It,

of course, begs the question to ask

how the individual would characterize him/herself.

Given
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persons can easily
ci^iiy spp
see ^v.on,o«^
themselves as members of
all
the groups listed above
"ve.
Or an .'r,^,ur
individual might never
characterize him/herself in
a way that most
^outsiderswould (e.g., ..terrorists"guerilla-bandits
-.criminals
.

-traitors,., ^degenerates..)

.

which role might be

a primary
self-definition depends on
personal biography, historical
and cultural times, and
even transitory settings
(e.g.,
at home vs in the doctor's

office).

So the researcher
characterizes and defines a
group of individuals then

attempts to establish a form

of rapport with them that
will allow participation in
viewing social experience
through their eyes. And constraints on what may be observed
and the form of research
conclusions will reside in part
within the complexities
of selection that define the
individuals who will be
considered the participants in this
social perspective.
There is, of course, a paradox
existent within the acts
of selection-characterization
on the one hand and the
assumed researcher relationship of
participant-peer on
the other.

Any reflection, explanation or description

of the population under study must
inevitably take a per-

spective that justifies or explains the selection
itself
from the perspective of an outsider, for those who
share
some other outsider point of view.

True insiders or par-

ticipants do not explain their participation in such terms

except perhaps when interacting with an outsider.

A
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prisoner's explanation
of wKy he/she is
an insia..
er
(as i. „e.e) „iu
.a.e on a .i„e.en.
.ex.u.e dependin,
on whether the
audience
ence is other
prisoners or some group
Of sociologists.
Insiders are not likel,
to describe
themselves by looking
through the eyes of
others.
They
are not likely to
o aescribe
descrih» their .
demographic make-up
social historical
context or position
in society as a
function of socio-economic
level.
These are the descriptive terms, perspectives
and points of view
of an outsider
Moreover to fail to
maintain such a perspective
runs the
risk of "going native."
An observer is considered
to
have "gone native" at
that point where s/he
may begin to.incorporate the role into
'

.

.

his spI f

.

j-wxe,

DUE rind he has so

violatpH
^^^^^^^ hie
ni-S
observer role ^ha^
? ^
almost
impossible
?
5
to rennr^ ht! findings.
Consequently the
f?o^^^ worker needs
field
cooling-off periods
complete^arti?ipa?ion at
whL'h^^^'
which time f^''
he can "be himself" and
look'
back on his field behavior
dispassionately
and sociologically.
(Gold, 1969.

^
-f

•

•

i

,

p

.

34)

Of course,

"dispassionate" and "sociological"
is exactly
what true insiders are not.
At the same
time this is a

necessary perspective for anyone
who wishes to report
"findings."
The distinction between insider
perspectives and
the point of view of outsiders
reporting with access to
inside information is constituted by
differences in point
of view.
It can sometimes be seen by looking
separately
at participant-observation field
notes, reported descrip-

tlons Of the experience
in the role of
participant
and the wider
contextual perspective
that describes the
research population.
These
i
inese th^^^
three elements
of the research
project can chronicle
i^ersion, .'going native"
and regaining of the
"dispassionate" outsider
perspective.
The field notes from
Wheeler (1978) describe
her
experiences working as an
attendant at a large state
school for the mentally
retarded.
The field notes contain, both in substance
and linguistic style,
the strong
intuitive feel of confusion,
frustration, resentment and
resignation, mixed with
sociological detached observation.
As the notes were
transformed into a report, the
topical
organization moved the impression
further along the continuum toward "outsider's
report from insider information."
However, the report still
seemed to describe from the

attendant's perspective, interpreting
incidents as they
would and focusing on those issues
that attendants felt
were important, for the reasons
they felt they were important. The final section of the
report placed the
events and experiences within a
larger societal context
of job structure, social change,
economics, and

ideology.

While it might be argued that this
analysis was sympathetic
or even consistent with the attendants'
perspective, it
nonetheless contained terms, explanations, and
contextual
descriptions that were not the ways in which they would
describe themselves.

Where the attendants tended to see
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problems arising fro.
within the administration
(its
incompetency, insenitivity
personal idiosyncracies
etc.), the report
tended to place the
whole relationship
Within a social structural
context. And
,

in the end this

larger sociological
perspective consumed all
other,
rs as
the dominating
perspective or explanation.
This description of the
Wheeler report is not a
criticism.
In fact, these three
rather distinct points
of View may be considered
the mark of competent
participant
observation, maintaining the
balance between "going native" and completely
detached insensitivity
The point
is, if she had assumed
only the attendants' point
.

of view,

then her descriptions and
explanations would have been
constrained within that perspective.
By alternatively
assuming an analysis of attendants
within a sociological
perspective, other explanations
and perspectives were
raised.
Neither the attendant nor the
sociological
description is more correct; they are
two perspectives
that describe and explain in quite
different ways. Moreover, they are incompatible, and imply
different understandings of the attendant experience.
It is not possible
to hold, at the same time, that the
circumstances within
the work experience are caused by "incompetent
adminis-

trators" who are blameworthy and that the causes lie
in
the wider context of a "social structure" that
creates

and maintains asylums as degrading institutions for all

-volved.
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The

^^^^^^

U.o.,a.a,U .Un r.ason
fro.

^^^^
any

Researchers who select
and characterise
also participate in constraining
the dimensions of
their conclusions and explanations.
Abandoning the professional
relationship of highly
controlled research does
not
exorcise the relational
quality of empirical
research
It Simply alters
the fonn of that
relationship.
Control
and compliance may
no longer be at issue,
but the observer
must still grapply „i,h
.^e dilec^a of the
insider vs
outsider relationship that
is inherent in the
act of
selection and characterization,
the end the researcher
must make a commitment
to a coherent point
of view that
will be inconsistent with
other coherent perspectives
and social connnitments
It is quite appropriate
to use
the term commitment,
for as we will see later
different
perspectives help constitute
distinct commitments to
quite different ways of life.

m

.

Concealmen t of Intent in n. and
the Denial ot Relati^^^^^F^
Concealment and deemphasis of research
intentions
plays a prominent role in both
controlling and non-controlling
research strategies.
Experimentalists conceal their hypotheses, explicit conceptions of the
experimental situation
and even the identity of the
interventions and measurements.
Those who attempt to assume
peer-relationships may likewise

Obscure or aee.phasize
their perspectives,
hypotheses
and the nature of
their observer role.
Whatever the
official reasons
understood by the
researcher it seems
to n,e that this
concealment serves the
purpose of obscuring the full
.eaningfulness of the
relationships
and the ultimate power
of the researcher
as scientist
to "name the reality"
from his or her own
perspective
Concealing or deemphasizing
researcher intentions, relationships, and conmitments
serves to maintain the researcher's legitimacy of
control and/or the appearance
of participating, accepting
and respecting the perspectives of those being
researched.
think this point can be
made most readily by
considering alternatives to
some of the research cited
earlier.
Consider what this research
might have looked
like had the interactions
with the participants been
such that the relationships
between researcher and participants was highlighted instead
of concealed or deemphasized.
In the control and shock avoidance
study
(Averill et al., 1977) the experimenter
might have reminded the subjects that while some
would consider that
pushing the avoidance button when the 100%
effective
signal was on would allow them to control
and avoid the
I

shock, others might consider the fact that
the researcher
could, now that they had agreed to participate,
change

the conditions as he/she wished.

I

suspect that reorienting

subjects in this way
.i^^t have swelled
the nu.he.
of those who did
not respond with
"instrumental vigilance" to the warning
in order to push
the avoidance
button.
Emphasizing another view
on the researchersubject relationship
would tend to undermine
the initial construal of the
situation and the legitimacy
of
the researcher to
construe reality for the
subjects.
In the Rubin and
Mitchell survey of intimate
couples they asked,
it is that
yo^ a^^^'^
marry eaEir^tHiFTTtrp:^^
T.T^frl^
O-lO/o through 9U-100%].
(p. 18)

This was one of those
questions discussed by the
authors
as stimulating discussion
and disclosure, and
ultimately
affecting the relationship
within couples. Of course,
by asking this question
the -experts" endorsed its
importance and relevance to
couple intimacy. And within
that part of the sample that
accepted them as legitimate
professionals this seemed to have
been an issue they
had not fully considered but
were willing to consider
as relevant to defining their
personal relationships.
Suppose the researchers had posed
the question within
another framework:
"Many noted psychologists have concluded that discussions of the probability
of marriage

should be avoided in intimate relationships
except when
or if one member wishes to propose in definite
terms.

Other experts believe it is important to discuss
this
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issue early in any
relationship.
troversy we invite you

Given this

c on-

to skip the following
question,

or answer it, as
you
wish
y u wisft.

"

q„.T. a
Such
statement would

undermine the legitimacv
ginimacy of i-i,
this question for
anyone
who did not already
ueiieve it i^r^r.
^
y believe
important.
Without
the full endorsement
of the professional"
it seems
likely that fewer couples
would have been persuaded
to consider this an
issue of importance
worth discussing
And those who chose to
answer the question might
be quite
different from those who
chose under such conditions
to
agree with the "don't Dush ^ho -f,,^
pusn the future" oriented
"experts."
Finally, it is clear that
Wheeler (1978) could not.
while assuming the role of
an attendant, persist
•

W

i:

'

in de-

scribing the circumstances
of herself and her co-workers
in social structural terms
in the face of the real
attendants' personal, and
characterological explanations.
This

would have immediately identified
her as an outsider, an
"intellectual type," "another kid
from
the college who

thinks she knows everything."

To so construe the situa-

tion would be to deny the attendants'
reality of "uppity
administrators," "insensitive superintendents."
and so
on.

It would have been,

in a very real sense, offensive.

It seems clear that concealing researcher
inten-

tions also conceals the implicit relationship
of the

researcher with the subjects of inquiry.

And this is,

of course, crucial for an empiricist social science
which

-St

only operate i„ the
do.ain of facts, not
agree-nts, behaviors, not
intentions.
i„ ehis regard it
xs not only important
to conceal researcher
intentions
and relationship
issues fro™ participants
who may not
Wish to hold these as
legiti„.te, it is equally
important that the researcher
not discover that
stable
and

reUable findings depend
upon implicit agreements
and
shared concepts.

So it would be equally
problematic if

subjects were to mumble
during the AveriU
experiment,
"sure, I agree with the
experimenter" or "I'll go along
and play this little
experimental reality."
It was in

fact perceived as a problem
when respondents informed
the researchers of how
much they had altered their
intimate relationships because
of the researchers' "expertness" in asking "important"
questions.
These occurrences are seen as problems
because they direct attention
to the participation of
eaientiete and subjecta together
oonstruoting realities through
relationships.
This would seem an appropriate
time to consider
the "ultimate" strategy for avoiding
the "problem of
confounding" researcher-subject relationships
with "true
effects." Of course, I am referring to the
completely

impersonal unobtrusive research strategy.

The researcher

and the participant do not interact face to
face.

The

participant does not know what the researcher's intentions,
hypotheses, or measurements involve.

Archival research.
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see fo^s

Of co^pletel,
oBscu.ea observation,
evaluation research, and
secondary reanal.ses,
fall under this
general strategy.
It should be clear,
however
uuwever,
,

detached

i-haf even
that
research

fron,

face-to-face Interaction
does not remove
the social scientist
fro. his/her relationship
with the
subjects of inquiry.
The researcher's
perspective or
po.nt of View is still
contained in the dimensions
of
sampling and characterization
of people, situations,
and
measurement indices. And
the point of views
expressed
through these decisions
and actions place the
researcher
in relationship viz-a-viz
the self-perceptions and
social
understanding existant with
those being researched and
other concerned parties.
It is through a point
of view,
from one relational perspective,
that the scientist
"names the reality."
The experimentalist, committed
to the importance
of systematic control and
"empirical validity," may select
situations that have been characterized
as "serendipitous

experiments" as an opportunity for
unobtrusive research.
But then s/he has the same problem
as in any situation
of control.
The participants in such a situation
tacitly
or explicitly accept the intervention
as "inescapable"
or "legitimate" within the bounds of
"reasonableness."

And the observer must accept their concepts of
social

reality or choose to characterize them within some
other

alternative social
conception.

The Sherif et al

(1961) Robbers Cave
Experiment ™ight be
considered

unobtrusive research.

The boys camp was
a real situation, natural enough,
and the researchers
interacted
through camp personnel
or in the convincing
role of
camp counselors.
The conclusions from
this study of
cooperation and competition
are

nonetheless constrained
by the "legitimacy
of camp personnel to
unilaterally
create and define
line situations,
sit-iian™„ segregate
campers, and
define "tasks" and "crises."
This research would seem
to allow generalizations
to other populations
of persons
who, like these ^uxxaren,
children are
at-p tt-?
n
willing
to accept such a
-,•

relationship as legitimate.

The institution of the

Draft Lottery in the early
1970s would seem to have been
a terrific opportunity
to examine some issues of
high
and low control, with random
assignment of young men to
the drafted low control or
unselected high control

group.
But of course such a characterization
depends on the
accepted "legitimacy" of the lottery
itself.
Canada
and federal prisons were full of
"error variance" and
"non-responders" in this regard. And conclusion
would

necessarily rest on one's point of view
about the concept of "control." Is "allowed" control,

being unselected,

the same as "seized" control, choosing
to refuse the

draft.

The concepts mentioned above are moral and
norma-

tive and suggest different points of view and ways
of

Ufe.

Given perspectives
shared by a group
of people
constrain their options,
opportunities and the
di.en-ons Of co^non sense.
Perspectives chosen
researchers
l..ewise define their
co™„it.ents and their
understanding
of systematic"
pattern, and "rando.
variability."
Concealment, detachment
or unobtrusiveness
may
remove the researcher
from personal interaction

but
It does not remove
him or her from standing
in some relationship with those being
studied.
In the end the
crucial issues of this
relationship involve naming
the
reality, and the constitution
of a way of life.
The

actions and decisions taken
by any researcher are
actions
within the framework of
descriptions and characterizations
from some point of view,
and face-to-face relationships
that are constituted by
legitimacy within a way
of life.

Social science may not then
gather the social facts.
Social
scientists participate in either
viewing or re-viewing
social reality, and in so doing
make themselves useful
within distinct points of view
and social commitments.
That is to say. our actions and
decisions as researchers
not only constrain the empirical
conclusions but also
help define the way of life, social
realities and commitments within which the research may
become useful.

Relationships. Common Sense
~
and Lfeetuiness
The relationships, dimensions of concepts
and common

sense, and the
construal of social
reality that
underly social research
constrain the empirical
conto which this
research may be put.

The shared concepts of legitimacy
and con^on sense
between researchers
and respondents allows
systematic patterns of
behavior
to be Observed.
At the same time,
these findings are
useful, informative
and reasonable only
within a way
of life that shares a
similar conception of
legitimacy,
common sense, and social
reality.

Walton (1975) describes

a

highly successful pro-

ject to create a "new
plant culture" in a General
Foods
pet food plant using
principles and theories largely
borrowed from social psychology.
The project originated
from consultations with
management concerned with the
problem of "employee alienation."
There were severe symptoms of
employee
alienation at the existing pet
food
factory
Kankakee.
Employee indifference and inattention while
manning
the continuous-process technology
led
to plant shutdowns, product
waste and
costly recycling. Numerous acts of
sabotage and violence were both costly
for the business and disintegrating
for the plant society.
We wanted to
design a plant where these attitudes
states would not occur.
Thus, we wanted
to avoid features of the existing
plant
which promoted alienation.
(p. 140)

m

The stated intent and theory of the "innovative"
work

design was to reduce alienation and increase the
workers'
sense of participation, involvement, commitment and
respon-

sib.Uty

.n the work
environment.

pushed, according

to Walton,

This was acc,
:om-

through the design of

the employees,
relationship with tasUs
fellow workers
and the management.
Changing the relationships
and
responsbilities was seen as
the major cause of
the
,

"impressive" improvement
in productivity and
"quality
of work life... Employees
worked on whole tasks in
small
groups rather than working
on repetitive single
tasks
on an assembly line.
Assignments of individuals
to sets
of tasks were subject to
decisions within work teams.
Status differentiation among
employees was minimized,
and dull and repetitive
jobs were automated or
subcontracted.
Visible signs of status
differences between
employees and management such
as separate parking lots,
separate building entrances and
differences in decor
were eliminated. There were
no time clocks.
As many
decisions as possible were allowed
to be made at the
lowest feasible level. Pay increases
were geared toward
rewarding employees for mastering an
increasing number
of the essential production tasks.

A somewhat different reading of Walton's
description suggests an alternative interpretation
of the inter-

vention and some noteworthy parallels between the
process
of "changing", the plant culture and the process
of "dis-

covery" in highly controlled research.

The key elements

of similarity reside in the common and essential relationshi

lU
and the sharing of
perspectives. Although
it i-s not
highlighted in his report,
report u=,i^
Walton's strategy for
creating
™ore productive and
"less alienating"
plant culture
can he seen as
relying heavily on
(1) selecting a popuat.o„ Of workers
with a .o.,.u,t.
.

„^

rulfillment

,

control
=r.A
control,
and
power,

(2)

conoealUg and de-

emphasizing alternative
points of .leu.
Walton does note that
employees were highly
selected
and that this was
important to the overall
structure and
success of the project.
We projected evolving
exDer^;.^^

^r,e

^

°^ con'-?ioAar"expectations were rising with
respect ?ochalgrowth, ^atte^ns^f
mu?^al'?nf?'"'°""'
''''^
ment .nS openness in egalitarian treatinterpersonal
relatinn^
^^^^
^e
set out to
f^oJ
that would be responsive
to evolving
employee expectations and
would pro?
vide a high quality of
work life enlist
unusual human involvement,
and r^suU
high productivity.
(p. 140)

orglSlat^r
organizations.

^

'

:

Ibr example,

•

m

we used an extensive recruiting
^^i^h encouraged the screening
a^d'^^f^r
and
self-selection processes to select
employees more likely to respond
positively to the organization we
had designed,
(p. 141)
•

.

.

Therefore, an early step was for team
members to visit sites where there
were ongoing experiments with nonconventional plant organizations and
talk with supervisory and worker participants, (pp. 148-149)

11

,

the persons selected
lr,^^
°
system
•

.

were iudffed
^
Relatively
amenable to tht^tl a
154^"^'^"""=^°"
had
in mind
(p

^

The prospective
employees were selected
then
for those Who would
come to understand
the new organizational structure, and
its potential for
"personal
growth" and "mutual
influence"
.ixuence trom
frnm the
m,
same point of
view as the designer and
the management.
That
is

workers were selected who
would define the context
and
dimension of "influence
within small (7-17) worker
groups.

Workers were selected
who understood co^non
parking lots and uniform
decor as "egalitarianness"
(sic) in the work setting.
This perspective on
influence and control is
roughly correspondent to the
concept of control assumed
by the experimenter and most
subjects in the study by
Averill et al. (1977).
Control and inf luencability
was defined within the structure
of immediate tasks
(ability to decide which of five
tasks to do, probability
of avoiding shock)
As in the experiment some
latitude
of doubt about this perspective
could be overwhelmed
through the power of the relationship.
For the employer
this power resided in their power to
legitimately grant
or withhold a job.
For the experimenter the mantle of
science lent credibility where sensibility was
not im.

mediately apparent.
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There are. of course,
other perspective s
on
"control," "innuence"
and "sclf-f.,nu..nf
wHicH
represent incompatible
points of view vis
a vis the
•innovative., plant
organization, As in the
experiment
a perspective on
personal t,onuroi
control that
^h.^ focuses
^
on the

P-....

^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
than simply the proximal
outcomes would not be
compatible Within this work
setting. What was
"error variance''
or an "inconsistent
responder" in the experiment
becomes
an employee with a
"bad attitude" within
the structure
of this plant organization.
The subject focuses on
the
power of the experimenter
to manipulate his/her
experience
in the experimentf
the "hari"
^
une
bad ^mr^i
employee focuses
on the
power that still resides with
the management.
The fact
that they now carry a black
lunch box. just like

his, is

not interpreted as a consequential
sign of "egalitarianness" or worker control within
this perspective.
The management of course
wished to achieve not

just "significantly different"
results; they wanted to
increase productivity and enlarge
their profits.
They
could not simply rely on random sampling
to select a
group that was predominantly consistent
with their perspective.
So they carefully selected.
Moreover, the

plant was not a short-term experiment; it was
a longterm enterprise, and they needed to insure that
the

necessary agreements in perspective that supported
the

higher productivity
persisted.
To .ake matters
worse
there is a highly
organized body of wor.ers
that espouse
an alternative point
of view.
Uhor unions are notoriously
hostile to the perspective
that control is defined
by
"allowed control- and
"management benevolence."
The answer to this problem in
the Walton project
appears only
once, buried in a
nine-column table under
"Favorable
Business Conditions"
necessary for
success.

No power groups will
exist within
the organization that
create an
ant 1 -management posture.
(p.

152)

It is perhaps not
surprising that research conducted
within the relationship of

legitimate professionalism,

control and compliance, and
shared perspective contains
some striking resemblance to
other conerns in the wider
society.
In both cases the interests
of the controllers
are best served by manipulating
implicit agreements about
social concepts.
The scientist can maintain the
illusion
of "accruing facts" detached from
human relationships.
The businessman can maintain control
and power by operating within a social reality that
conceals alternatives
to the status quo.

Stability and continuity in business

practices and the body of knowledge both depend on
the

understanding that these social agreements are the
"nature
of things.

"

The congruity between current conceptions of

social science and the range of usefulness is not limited

to circumstances
that are so clearly
related to

issues of control.

m

recent years Jacobo
Varela
has gained some notoriety
through his

applicatic
-ons
of social psychological
theory to "social probl.
.ems

Appropriately enough, he
describes his methods of
application as "Social
Technology- (1977, 1975,

1971).

%rela

is very explicit
about the fact that

his concept of social
intervention is directly tied
to and an extension of
the experimental paradigm.
It has often been
remarked that one
sciences
^^^^
^^^^^
t° follow the
nh.^cphysical sciences too slavishly.
My
contention is that they have
not
followed them enough.
(p. 915^ 1977)
To follow the physcial
sciences more slavishly is to
strive for power over "variables,"

controlled manipu-

lation of procedures, and the
achievement of predictable behavior.
Indeed, "social technology"

seems an
apt characterization for the
extension of this approach
to applied social issues.

The social technological approach
is illustrated

easily through the case study of

a young

woman who

turned to alcohol and marijuana after her
rejection

by an art school admissions committee.
Beatrice (Rosa's friend) easily diagnosed Rosa's abuse of alcohol and
drugs as coinciding with a curt rejection note she received to her application for eagerly sought admission
to an art school.
The shock of rejection was interpreted by Rosa as
a rejection of her artistic values
and abilities.
(p. 916)
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Wla

goes on to describe
Rosa^s dimcuUies
in
ter^s of an
approach-avoidance proble.
concerning
the desire to pursue
art and the fear
of further
rejection.
He chose to assist
Beatrice in an attitude change intervention
to return Rosa to
her previous involvement
nt in art.
arttu
This was expected
to conflict With and reduce
her abusive indulgence
in alcohol and drugs.
The intervention
carried out by
"""'^ and Beatrice was described
in terms of Sherif
and Hovland (1961)
latitude of rejection
scales
Likert ratings (1932).
cognitive dissonance (Pestinger, 1957) and reactance
theory (Brehm, 1966).
The manipulation
involved Beatrice engaging
Rosa in an orchestrated
conversation (unknown to
Rosa, of course) using
various verbal ploys to induce her to assert increasingly
positive statements

m

•

consistent with resuming her
art work.
eliciting verbal commitment

By first

to the least negatively

valenced statement (rated by
Beatrice as something
Rosa would not initially
endorse) and moving slowly
towards statements more consonant
with resuming art
work, Rosa would change her
attitude and the inter-

vention would succeed.

Beatrice's rating of state-

ments which Rosa would and would not
initially agree
with and the progression of orchestrated
conversation
are listed below.

.

.
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Statement

.^^^^r

_

Likert
Attitude
Rating

1

+8

2

-1

Statement
I've always loved art.

following
advice when she
disapproved of my painting.

L'^^'^.J^^^'^
my mother's
3

-2

There are always obstacles
the lives of artists.

m

4

-3

Artists should not necessarily
tollow the dictates of the
critics
Art school staff do not have
the time nor are they infallible
judging applicant portfolios.

m

^

7

School's^ -j^
opinion
j.i.ia.vjn
is
X£)
just one more negative opinion
that most artists face.
-6

I

think I'll reapply for next

term.
8

-7

I'll send them some of my new
art

9

-8

Give me materials.
I'm starting
to paint now.
(Varela, 1977
p.

According to Varela

's

917)

report, Beatrice was highly

successful in manipulating Rosa to make these
successive

assertions and in encouraging Rosa to resume her
art work
Quoting Beatrice,
She worked all afternoon, thoroughly immersed in the feelings of the beings
in her drawings
More and more of the
old enthusiasm returned. At one point
she looked at herself surrounded by the
materials and new creations and said:
"This isn't what we had planned for the
afternoon.
What did you do to me?" I
.
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^reU

describes ,he success
of his technological"
intervention:

i£-"---"-"'^-n^th:f-.^^^
drawings, gone on two
photoeraDhv

^T^?^'^^

aband

^^^^

o1SfiS^l^^^^^%\-^
Indeed,

^^?T.c

slJ^^rvTr^tLur^"

--P^

so^^al

Varela did recreate the
essential elements

of the experimental and
controlled methodology in this
applied situation. All the
elements seem to be present.
Beatrice, a trusted friend
and legitimately powerful
person with Rosa, clearly and
accurately assessed Rosa's
social reality and perspective
on her art school rejection.
The underlying perspective
shared by Beatrice and
Rosa comes out clearest in the
scaled Likert statements.
Despite some intermediate protestations
to the contrary
(statements 4. 5, 6 and even those
equivocate) the bottomline reality for Rosa was that the
opinion and endorsement
of the art school was an important
indication of her com-

petence as an artist and her personal worthiness.
ments

7.

8,

and

9

State-

reassert that the important issue is

to "get back to work" so next time with "new art
work"

she will be "up to standards."

\arela reaffirms this

perspective by the importance
he places on reapplication as an index of
success with
Rosa.

But, of course,

therp a-ro
tnere
are alternative
perspectives
that could be taken.
There are other
resolutions, from
other points of view,
that could allow Rosa
to return
to her loved art work,
discontinue her abuse of
drugs
and resolve her self-doubt:
refocusing on her personal
satisfaction gained from
artistic activities, a
rejection
of the legitimacy of the
school's opinions, disconnecting
others' opinions of her
artistic talents from her
assessment of self-worth, and so
on.
But, of course, in these
cases, involving more
fundamental changes, the social
,

psychological literature is not
so informative and the
implicit goal of rapid return

to the status quo is vio-

lated.

These alternatives remained
invisible partly
because they were concealed behind
the tacit agreements
about social reality, and the
belief that the way things
are is the way things must be,
all this shared by %rela,
Beatrice and Rosa.
It is clear that fundamental
tacit agreements

play an important role within relationships
of control
and compliance.
In the experiment, the
factory, and

the intimate relationship agreements about
the legitimacy

of the power-compliance relationship (expert,
financial,

affectual) and the commonsensical nature of shared
points
of view helped conceal any fundamental alternatives.

But
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it is also true that
fundamental commitments to a

social perspective operate
outside of power-compliance
relationships, even outside of
face to face interactions
altogether. As discussed earlier
(Chapter II) commitments to a point of view may
become invisible by virtue
of their very ubiquitousness
Our socially constructed
concepts become the "nature of
things" because they help
constitute our personal lives and
make sense of the wider
social milieu.
Be that as it may, these
perspectives are
elements of social commitment and
they do constrain
.

the

ways in which we understand the world.

It is because

we hold these perspectives as
internalized reality that
they may become invisible. And it is
this fact that

underlies the actions and decisions of ethnological
and
participant observation techniques, and the acceptancepeer relationships they attempt to assume.

VJhether an

observer accepts the "reality" of those observed or
subsumes this reality within a wider contextual analysis
the empirical conclusions will be constrained by the

inherent researcher decisions and perspectives.

And

whatever relationship is assumed, the point of view
will constrain the real world actions and uses that
are reasonable within it.
The bottom line of any description and character-

ization can be understood as "naming the reality."

And

some current literature offers very dramatic illustrations
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of the ways described realities
fit within some commitments and not others, within
some ways of life but
not others.
Ian Lubec (1977a, 1977b)
offers an example
of alternative conceptions
of "aggression" and their
imbeddedness in contrasting world
views.
The central
themes revolve around the
criteria and dimensions of

human action that define violence
and aggression and
the interpretive values placed
on these acts.
It is
clear for example that most social
psychological research and common conceptions of
violence are understood
within an interpersonal and dyadic
context.
Violent

acts include hitting, shooting,
shocking, etc.

Partly

because of some methodological traditions
and partly
because of widely held implicit understandings,
other
activities that might be considered aggressive
and

violent are not easily included within theoretical
and
empirical frameworks:
polluting, job termination,

discriminatory hiring and firing, I.Q. testing, deameaning
media characterization of ethnic groups, etc.
clear, however,

It is

that within another framework these

less direct, but nonetheless consequential, actions

could be considered acts of extreme violence and aggression.

Then,

of course, if one assumes this point of

view a number of other concepts must be readjusted.
What is the evaluation now of sabotage by individuals

who have been "aggressed" against?

What is the punishment
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for discriminatory hiring
which relegates minorities
to positions of joblessness
and poverty?

Should capital

punishment be considered as an
appropriate punishment
for premeditated pollution,
and so on?
Lubec also points out that when
violence and
aggression are understood within
a dyadic perspective
and the definition is restricted
to immediate and direct
actions it seems more reasonable
to place a negative value
on all such acts.
This negative valuation and a focus
on reducing aggression has characterized
most theorizing
in social psychology.
However, there are other perspectives.
The largely ignored work of Sorel
(1908) took
a wider view on the definition of
aggression and conse-

quently placed a different value on some violent
actions.
To the point, Sorel considered violence on
the part of

oppressed groups to be both natural and understandable
in the face of long suffered conditions and
preceding

acts of violence perpetrated by ruling classes.
Sorel 's approach held that violence
was functional, good, a normal part
of the socio-political process of
antagonistic class conflict, and
should be encouraged in heroic, apocalyptic struggles.
(Lubec, 1977b, p.

1)

The point here, of course, is not to endorse one

point of view or the other.

Rather, it is most impor-

tant to recognize that these two perspectives on aggres-

sion and violence,

(1)

represent two different and in-

compatible perspectives,

(2)

each perspective constrains

the holders' understanding
of the social world,

(3)

each understanding of the
social world carries
within it implied actions and
activities with real
world consequences, and
(4) in so
far as one is

committed to a perspective s/he
is also committed to
a way of life.
Other commentaries illustrate
these same points
considering other phenomena. Ryan's
(1972) discussion
of the implicit perspective
of "Blaming the Victimtraced the relationship of "person
centered" explanations to social programs that
maintain poverty while

appearing to support reform.

Priere (1970) discussed

the ways in which the oppressed
poor have been led to

maintain their positions as underdogs
by their tacit
acceptance of the wider society's concepts

and explan-

ations of their condition.

A recent review of the

literature on Black and white doll preference
among
Black children (Banks, 1976) supported
conclusions
that suggested "white child ethnocentrism" as a
rea-

sonable reinterpretation of data that had been used
to argue that Black children maintained a "poor
self

image."

The widely held interpretation was part of

the support for the degrading concept of Black children
as living in "cultural deprivation."

Lobov (1969)

studying the verbal abilities of Black ghetto children

made a similar point from researching speech patterns

within a different empirical relationship.
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It is not necessary at this
point to continue

the chronicling of research
relationships and per-

spectives that help constitute
empirical conclusions.
The point I wish to make here
is a more general one.
Within our empirical techniques,
the activities of
inquiry, are contained the
perspectives that constrain
conclusion and interpretations. And
these constraints
and commitments are also part of our
commitments
to

a way of life and a view of social
reality.

Most

important perhaps, is the understanding
that these

commitments and their implications cannot be
reduced
to "empirical questions."

Ibr

example, in the case

of "concepts of control" one perspective is
"better"
than the other depending on one's commitments to
a

way of life.

The men and wom.en in the factory, under-

standing control within a very local framework, were

reported to be very pleased with the quality of their

work life.

To adopt a point of view that understood

themselves as powerless vis a vis the management would

involve personal costs and benefits and could only be

weighed according to values and commitments about how
they wished to live.

They could lose their jobs; but

they could also gain a fellowship with a larger group
of organized workers.

They could lose an opportunity

to work in pleasant surroundings under conditions of

"powerlessness" on the chance, in the long run, of

.
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establishing truly "egalitarion"
relationships of
worker and management
negotiated work conditions.
These are conflicts about
what one values, how one
wants to live, and commitments
to the integrity of
world views. These are not
empirical questions.
Clearly, a similar analysis
is possible for Rosa and
others
Social scientists have become so
absorbed in
the pursuit of "facts," "validity"
and the use of
"methodological tools" of discovery
that they have
lost sight of their participations
in a social reality.
This understanding of the enterprise
has obscured the

ways in which particular perspectives
have been reified
and conserved as if they were the nature
of things.

This conservatism is reflected in the
potential use of

"scientific" methods and theories in applied settings.
Coming to an understanding of the ways in which
a social

scientist must necessarily participate in a set of

perspectives and commitments within the context of empirical relationships casts the social scientific enter-

prise in an entirely different light.
If it is considered essential that researchers

report sampling procedures, sample sizes, statistical
analyses, measurement procedure and so on, then it would

seem at least equally important that scientists attempt
to explicate the dimensions of social perspectives that
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also define and constrain the
meaningfulness of their
data.
"Rigorous." "legitimate," and "competent"
science
then could be redefined to require
this form of selfreflection and self -consciousness.
I am speaking, of
course, of social scientists and the
social scientific

enterprise in general taking responsibility
for actions
and decisions that reflect social
commitments.
I

have argued for a reorientation, turning
from

the aspirations of empiricism, facts, and
validity to
the pursuit of self -consciousness and good
faith in

social scientific inquiry.
I

In so doing it is clear that

have dwelt more on anomalies, problems, and contradic-

tions than

I

have on solutions.

And indeed, the ideal

of pursuing self -consciousness in social science does

raise more problems and questions than it does ready
solutions.

Eindamental assumptions and perspectives

tend to be difficult to bring into awareness.

They exist

like the air; it is everywhere and therefore invisible.
Or our perspectives and social realities are so private

that they never see the light of day and therefore do

not encounter existent contradictions, with their potential for raising consciousness about alternatives.
I

will not resolve these dilemmas.

I

can only suggest

some activities of inquiry that would seem consistent

with this new empirical enterprise.
I

In the next Chapter

will discuss the relationship of self-consciousness

to the concept of good faith in social science.

CHAPTER

V

GOOD FAITH SOCIAL SCIENCE:

FROM

PRIESTHOOD TO POLITICS
In the preceding chapters

I

have considered empirical

methods as researcher actions and
researcher shaped relationships with the subjects of
inquiry.
I have argued
that such a view of empirical
methods refocuses attention
on the ways that empirical conclusions
are constrained
by the perspectives of the researcher
and the implicit
agreements within empirical relationships.
Given this
analysis I would like to suggest the beginnings
of an

enterprise for the social sciences that can
transcend the
limitations of empiricism.
The mechanical rules of "objective science"
have

obscured the participatory role of scientists in their
relationships with those studied and the society that

might put their theories and interpretations to practical
use.

The alternative to this orientation focuses not

on "facts" but "perspectives" and replaces the aspirations
of "validity" with the goals of "social responsibility."

While

I

would not pretend to define an alternative science

it is possible to suggest the outlines of this alternative.

A participatory science can no longer stand aloof as the
priesthood of objectivity.

It must face the challenges
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of participation in good faith.

And in so far as the

coins of controversy are the
commitments to ways of
life and human values, participation
will necessarily
take the form of politics.

Good Faith Social Science
The relational qualities of social
inquiry have

been obscured by the long standing focus
on empirical
methods as "tools" for establishing "social
facts."

Empirical strategies have been applied and understood
as independent of the researcher and the
researched.

And this view has allowed the socially legitimated
re-

lationships and implicit agreements that support the

researcher-participant interactions to remain invisible
constituents of scientific results, conclusions and
interpretations.

These social relationships, based on

the currency of legitimate agreements and invisible

alternatives, have been reified as truths and basic
knowledge.

Social science has not come to grips with

the inherently participatory nature of social reality

and its constitutive empirical regularities.

Because

social scientists have not recognized their own partici
pation, because social facts have been construed as

separate and detached, empirical social inquiry has
tended to sanctify the status quo, to conserve and

anoint existant social reality as the "natural order."

.

Many of the concepts addressed
by social
are essentially contestable.
However,

sci,
-ence

to the extent

that normative social concepts
are understood as social
facts they may remain
uncontested.
Concepts of "control
and personal influence,"
"aggression and violence."
"mental health," "sex roles."
"social power." and "compliance" may be socially defined
and understood in a

variety of ways.

To the extent that social
scientists

focus on the behavioral regularities
of existent conceptions and reify these empirical
regularities as social
facts, then they participate in
a set of conservative

commitments
The behavioral regularities of subjects
under

varying conditions of "potential control"
as they emerged
from the relationships within the Averill et
al

(1977)

,

.

study

and the "successful" restructuring of a plant

society by Walton and his managerial colleagues do
not

reflect the facts and applications of "control" and be-

havioral response, but rather the limits of instrumental
action within existent social concepts.

Those with al-

ternative understandings of control and personal influence that did not fit within the conceptual status quo

were viewed as "inconsistent responders" and "employees

with bad attitudes," respectively.

Empirical research

that defined aggression and violence in interpersonal

and dyadic terms finds behavioral regularities among
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the majority of participants
who share thi:-s view.

More detached and indirect
forms of aggression remain
uninvestigated and excluded from
the currently held

concepts of violence.

Those who recognize the "reality"

of remote aggression and respond
with counter-aggression
are understood in normative
terms as "deviants." "abnormal,
and within the current conceptions,
"irrational." The
forms of rational and normative
real world responses

within this view are obvious; they
are equally obviously
defined by the normative legitimate
reality, not by the
"facts."
Social scientific inquiry does not have
access to
the "facts," only to various social
conceptions and their

constuitive actions and behaviors.

Because this has not

been well understood the interpretations of empirical
inquiry have been limited by the study of random samples
and the normative realities shared by the majority of
those sampled.

Perhaps unwittingly, this form of

research, with its dependence on criteria of validity

associated with "means and central tendencies." has
tended to identify and theorize within the domain of
a normative conceptual reality.

If a social science

of facts is impossible, an "unwitting" social science
is certainly unacceptable.

Any alternative must include

some understanding of its participation and implication

within the social commitments that are also the subject
of inquiry.

A legitimate social science must pursue

.
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self-consciousness and explicitness
about these commitments that help constrain empirical
results and
interpretations.
The pursuit of such self
-consciousness
can be the foundation of a social
science in Good Faith.
The central aspirations of a
good faith social
science revolves around issues of
self -consciousness
If socially defined concepts help
constitute social
realities they cannot be bannished from
social inquiry.
And if social scientists, like everyone
else, must view
social phenomena from within a point of view
then they

are necessarily participants as well as
observers.
The difficulty of the enterprise becomes
more apparent when I realize that my
perspective itself has emerged out of
my personal history of social transactions.
I share it with selected
others with whom I interact, and its
structure helps to constitute the
fabric of our relationships.
These
others are the ones I habitually turn to
to check the adequacy of my concepts,
the plausibility of my beliefs, the
propriety of my values. And yet, since
our shared perspective has developed
out of shared social experiences, my
habitual procedure hardly encourages
the self -consciousness I need to develop.

(Connolly, 1973, p.

27)

Facing the problems and challenges of explicating these
social perspectives as they define the constraints,

meaningfulness

,

and uses of empirically derived results

and interpretations will be the measure of good faith
for social scientific enterprises within a wider societal

context.

.
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Self-consciousness will not be fully
achieved
through simple admonitions to
"know thyself," or well
intentioned researcher introspection.
Awareness of
fundamental social agreements and
perspectives that

constitute commitments to a way of life
are revealed
through their confrontation with
alternative perspectives and commitments

By confronting unfamiliar presumptions
opposing theories I am able to render
my own tacit views more explicit. By
striving to perceive the world from other
angles of vision" I begin to grasp more
explicitly the habits of classification
I employ.
I begin to see that my disagreements with others do not only or always
constitute simple disagreements of fact;
they also reflect a variable weighting
of the "same facts" and subtle differences in the way we slice and organize
experience.
The suggested approach
and promised results of this enterprise
are lucidly summarized by Stuart Hampshire:

m

The habits of self-conscious criticism
may modify the habits of behavior. But
the habits of criticism are themselves
only revised by further criticism and
comparison, and by communication with
minds that are outside the circle of
convention and custom within which he
is confined.
(Connolly, 1973, p. 27
and Hampshire, 1959, p. 208)
Ian Lubek's (1977a, 1977b) analysis of social psychological approaches to aggression research revealed the limits
of the concepts by posing alternative definitions with

their own internal rationale and social perspective.

Sampson (1977) traced the underlying commitments to

"self-sufficient individualism" in American psychological
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research by posing alternative values
that suggested
alternate conceptions of "mental
health," and "sex
roles." and the possibility of
other socially legitimate
realities.
When alternatives such as these
are raised
they suggest another way of life
and a different set
of commitments for empirical researchers.

A social science in good faith must
embrace criticisms and discourses such as those noted
above
as an

integval part of the smpirioal enterprise.

Such critiques

are not ancillary, nor are they simply
interesting his-

torical footnotes; they represent disputes about
the

meanings and social uses of empirical research and social
commitments.

Clearly, suggestions that research on "con-

trol and social influence" has restricted its conceptions
to current normative social understandings constitutes
a challenge to the legitimacy of the concept and the

legitimacy of the way of life that is constrained by it.
Similarly, any analysis of fundamental conceptions and

their representations within social research raises the

possibility of alternatives and the possibility of other
legitimate commitments.

Such disputes about legitimacy

and social commitment are not empirical disputes in the

traditional sense.
ical

.

These disputes are essentially polit-

.
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From Priesthood to Politics
The social scientific
aspirations of "objective
fact" and "basic knowledge"
have allowed social scientists to engage in social
relations as members of a
priesthood.
These objectives have been seen
as transcendant over other human
enterprises, ultimately good
for all.
This priestly position has
fashioned the form
and substance of discourse and
dispute. When the aspiration is to seek "truth" then the
alternative must be
seen as "ignorance." "Scientific
methods" are understood
as the tools for gathering
facts and all facts are seen
as valuable elements of knowledge,
part of the "natural
order." Base human values and issues
of political relevance are thought to reside only in "the uses
of knowledge,"
a matter quite apart from science.

Human values that

have been seen to invade activities of the
priesthood

have been addressed as alien bodies from the human
realm,
to be exorcised from the ritual and the sanctity
of the

temple.

In this way the priesthood of science has es-

tablished the legitimacy of its activities through a

marriage with the ideals and aspirations of the enterprise.

And by tying the human activity of social research

to the ideals of truth,

the disputes and discourse about

legitimate activity have been truncated and limited in
scope
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It is clear by now
that this priesthood,
like
others, is intimately
involved in issues of human

value.

It is clear that the
activities of empirical

research are constituted by
human perspectives, and
connnitments to particular
ways of life. And

the ideals

of "truth- and "knowledge"
that have exempted these
activities from scrutiny by
the unanointed nonscientist
have only served to conceal
their participation in the

negotiation of social realities.
In the last chapter,

I

which research relationships,

illustrated the ways in
the

understanding of social

concepts and the potential uses
of research findings
are mutually constituted. Moreover,
the social commitments that are represented within
these relationships
are essentially contestable.
They may represent ways
of life that from another point of view
are seen to be

oppressive or otherwise unacceptable.

The contests

that must be engaged are not contests about
facts; social
facts reside within a way of life.

The contests are about

the preferred structure of social relationships
themselves

Such disputes are inherently political.

Insofar as the

social scientific enterprise is implicated within these
disputes, participation in good faith will require social

scientists to face unsettling questions concerning social

responsibility, the limits of legitimate scientific
activity, censorship, and political action.
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Because social perspectives
help constitute

ways of life, the connnitments
within social scientific
research are potentially
implicated in wider social
disputes.

It would not seem reasonable
to expect labor
unionists to show great enthusiasm
for social research

which conceives of "control and
influence" within a
definitional framework of "asymetrical
legitimate power"
and "allowed choices and options."
Such an understanding
generates information about the
manipulability
of indiv-

iduals within this limited conception,
instrumental responses that can be elicited under the
"illusion of
control," and so on. Research of this
sort allows con-

sultants such as Walton to describe his
factory work-

place interventions as "applied social
psychology" as
the application of "basic knowledge."

Many people under-

stand themselves to be victims of "institutional
aggression
and violence."

Such an understanding may allow sabotage,

theft, and revolt as reasonable defensive measures
against

such societal oppression.

Why should such persons from

the classes of the oppressed support research which de-

fines aggression in individualistic terms suggesting so-

cietal interventions to "ameliorate" individual aggression?

Within this conception they will be understood as abnormal,
sick, maladjusted, and deviant.

Attention is focused on

their "aggressiveness" outside of the context of their

victimization.

These disagreements represent political
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disagreements and political
negotiations and solutions
are suggested.
Such political disputes
have already
resulted in confrontations
concerning Arthur Jensen's
work on intelligence and
race (Jensen. 1969; Block
and
Dworkin. 1976) and testing
in general.
I believe

that
there are other traditions of
research, such as those
mentioned above, that are no
less politically relevant.
They have escaped dispute to
the degree that their inherent commitments and particular
applications have
remained concealed and misapprehended
as "basic and
applied knowledge."

The political complexities of a
social scientific

enterprise may be most like those of the
news media in
a democractic society.
The news media also have the

problem of reporting from a point of view, of
selecting
"newsworthy" stories, asking "revealing" questions,
using "responsibility" in their choice of stories
to
run, etc.

The perspectives, descriptive terms, and

social concepts used by news reporters are also essen-

tially contestable.
papers

{flew

A comparison of news reporting across

York Times, Rolling Stone, Pravda, The Real

Paper in Boston, etc.) clearly reveals the difference
in perspectives, and commitment to ways of life that are

reflected in what stories are considered important and
what the "facts" are seen to be.
iiews

And, of course,

the

media are completely enmeshed in the political

"
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process; they have been
seen as the -watchdogs of
government." "responsible
informants for society,"
"tools of Wallstreet,"
"supporters of an illegal war
and so on. And both the
public at large and machinery
of government have been
engaged in conflict over the
appropriate activities and roles
of news reporting in
a democratic society:
can a reporter protect his/her
sources; should they be
prosecuted for receiving classified information; when may they
be sued for liable or
false reporting; how does the
public respond to "irresponsible" reporting, political bias.
etc.
Newspersons
like scientists claim to report
only the "facts." I
,

would suggest that "scientific facts"
are subject to
the same problems as "newsfacts."
Moreover, it would
seem reasonable to place "scientific
facts" within the
same discourse of societal considerations
that has

constituted our perennial attempts to define the
proper
relationship of the news media and the democratic
process.

When newspaper chains become too large and hold
too large a monopoly there is fear of "one-sided reporting"

and consideration of forcing the sale of some papers.

When newspapers are viewed as "irresponsible" there is
discussion of censorship, as in the case of reportage
on terrorism, hijackings, etc.

The public's confidence

waxes and wanes as papers are perceived as biased or

unfair (consider the changes in opinions about the

.

Washington Post from the time
of the first Watergate
stories to the announcement by
President Ibrd that
he wished to "restore confidence
in government")
do not wish to characterize
the news media in
America as having achieved a
state of "balanced" reI

porting and "objectivity" by virtue
of its participation
in the political process.
But I would suggest
that the

questions that are relevant for the
enterprise of generating "newsfacts" are also relevant
for the enterprise
of generating "science facts." The
scientific enterprise
too can indulge in "irresponsible"
or "unacceptable"
activities.

Editorial policies can be viewed as ideo-

logically biased and as a threat to "the people's
right
to know" from some alternative point of view.
It
be-

comes legitimate to reconsider the relationships
of
"basic researchers" with the uses of their research in

consulting.

To whom is the research useful, and whose

interests are served?

Should tax money be spent on

research which is viewed as perpetuating social concepts
contributive to the existing class structure, and so on?
Raising the inherent political issues that constitute the social scientific enterprise is indeed an un-

settling business.

It raises the specter of the full

range of political actions:

ideologically informed fundin

decisions, editorial policies and hiring policies, social

ridicule, censorship, etc.

These are actions and issues
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that have traditionally been
seen as anathema to the
social scientific enterprise.
I would only suggest
that they have by tradition
remained implicit, not
absent.
The description of politics
in science ha^
IS
been undertaken by others,
including pressures to conform in research style (especially
highly controlled
experimentation in social psychology)
choice of
publication outlet, and fund raising
from available
granting sources (Lubec. 1977; Bevan,
1970; Greenberg,
1977; and others in Lubec).
Social scientists have
served the interests of business
(Baritz, 1960) and
advertising (Ewen, 1976), with more interest
in selling
than consumer protection, more interest
in production
.

than worker rights.

By raising the political issues

and commitments to the level of explicit
discourse,
science may run the risk of more extreme forms
of dis-

pute and conflict.

But then the alternative to con-

flict must be resignation or obfuscation.
The priesthood of science has created the illusion
of detachment in an "ivory tower" of pure knowledge.
As social scientists begin to reexamine and debate the

social commitments inherent in their research relationships and theoretical formulations this illusion of de-

tachment will dissolve.

I

have suggested elsewhere that

the focus on "methods as tools" has led to the unwitting

support of existant social perspectives and the conserva-

.

tion of existant social
relationships.
course, not a new idea.
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This is, of

Kvale (1973) has discussed

the ways in which behaviorism
serves the purposes of

maintaining relationships within
and industrial state.
Friere

a

highly technological

(1970) has argued that

existant social understandings
have helped maintain
the poor and oppressed
classes in a state of hopelessness and noncompetition with
ruling classes.
Personcentered explanations (Ryan.
1971) and humanistic psychology (Ratner, 1971) have been
viewed as liberal social
ideology in the service of existant
class structure and
the diversion of attention from
the possibility of more
radical explanations and prescriptions.
There have,
of course, been others who have made
the same point:

under the guise of objectivity, social
scientific
findings have tended to lend support and
legitimacy
to the conservation of existant social
arrangements.

And those who have vested interests in such
conservatism
have found empiricist social science to be a comfortable

companion
It should be clear that raising the level of dis-

course in social science, questioning the commitments,
uses, and perspectives of research relationships and

conclusions will inevitably place the discussants in a

more adversarial posture vis a vis existant power holders
in society.

Paulo Friere was exiled from Brazil for his

•
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efforts in helping the poor
liberate themselves from
their docile acceptance of
degrading self -definitions
and social agreements about
the inevitability of their
class position. Walton was
hired to increase production;
he would not have been retained
to "raise consciousness"
among workers.
Social scientists who discuss and
legitimize social concepts that might
threaten the existant
social order should expect to see
their stock drop with
those invested in the status quo.
The empiricists'
implicit reification of the social
order as the "nature
of things" is well suited to those
whose power and profits
rely on existant. often implicit,
social agreements.

Self -consciousness about social commitments,
essential
to a good-faith social science, will
suggest alternative

arrangements and the possibility of social changes
that
may alter the distribution of influence and power.

This

discourse will serve to heat up the public debate, bring
the legitimacy of the social scientific enterprise
into

question, and in general make life a good deal more prob-

lematic for social scientists.
I
I

will not presume to answer the serious questions

have raised about the legitimacy of various social

scientific concepts and relationships in the research
enterprise.
ever,

I

That is not to say

I

have no opinion.

How-

do have less faith in moralizing than in the po-

tential of a more moral way of life.

That is to say,

I
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would prefer to focus, for
the moment, on the broader
issues.

If social science is to
participate in good

faith within a society, then
it is imperative that we
go beyond the discussion
of validity and inference
to face the real issues and
political realities of
our enterprise.
The discourse on social
responsibility,
legitimacy, obligation, academic
freedom, public access
and so on belongs in the political
arena, not in the
false sanctity of the temple of
science.

Good Faith Social Science an d
the Activity of inquiry
I

have argued throughout this dissertation
that

the enterprise of social science should
be understood

within the fabric of wider social commitments.

The

research questions that are asked, the relationships

within the investigative activity, methodological actions
and decisions, the self-images of those in the social

scientific enterprise and the dimensions of existant
social realities are all internally related.
to say,

That is

social scientists and the profession of social

science are full participants in the negotiations and

renegotiations that help constitute social ways of life.
From this point of view the most important issues facing

individual scientists and the profession concern the

fashioning of our own way of life.

I

have proposed that

the aspirations of social science be turned toward the

pursuit of self -consciousness and the open negotiation

of social reality.

I

have proposed a Good Faith

Social Science.
T^is argument has attempted
to re-view the activities of inquiry, and in the
process arrive at a new

understanding of rigorous social
science and social responsibility. Within the present
perspective these two
concepts merge. Rigorous science
must attempt to explicate the constituent social
commitments that define
the meaningfulness of conclusions
and interpretations.
Moreover, such self -consciousness emerges
from open
critique and discourse between those who
identify with
discrepant and conflicting points of view.
Consciousness
raising occurs when the rationality and
self-interests
of one perspective are confronted with allegations
of

irrationality and perhaps illegitamacy from some other
point of view.

The process by which self-consciousness

is pursued also becomes the process of open
negotiation

and social responsibility.

Social responsibility then

is no longer understood as the activity of social scien-

tists when they are being "good citizens."

Theoretical

self-consciousness and social responsibility merge within
the concept of rigorous social science and the social

scientific way of life.
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Postscript
began this dissertation by
referring to a
sense of crisis in social
psychology and other social
scientific endeavors.
I have focused attention
on the
ways in which philosophical
empiricism, as it is understood in the social sciences,
has alienated researchers
from their inherent embeddedness
in social life.
I

I

have addressed both the crisis and
the potentials for
resolving this crisis by arguing for
the commonality
of social science with other social
ways
of life.

For

social scientists as well as others, we
are at the same
time recipients, actors, and inquirers
within our ex-

isting social reality.

No amount of mental or methodo-

logical gymnastics will allow us to escape this
essential

human condition.

I

have argued that an understanding of

the ways in which social scientists share this
condition

sheds light on the nature of the current crisis of con-

fidence and at the same time suggests the directions
for an alternative social scientific enterprise.

Em-

pirical researchers must come to grips with the realities
of the participant- inquirer role, a role in which rigorous

research,

theoretical self -consciousness

.

political con-

flict, and social responsibility tend to merge into what
I

have called "good faith social science."
By focusing on be basic issues of the commonality

of social science and social life other relevant concerns
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have not been addressed.

If social research may
not

be independent of the
social-historical context in
which it occurs, is it also
true that social research
may not be distinguished from
other social enterprises?
Does social scientific research
contain any fundamentally
different characteristics that
distinguish it from news
reporting, literature, or political
advocacy? What
claims can be made for the character
of systematic em-

pirical inquiry?

have not addressed these issues.

I

Reestablishing social science as an
inherently social
activity loomed increasingly larger and
as logically prior
to these questions.
I must admit that at this
point the
distinctions between social scientific inquiry,
newsreporting, literature, politics, and so on
seem relatively
trivial to me in the face of their essential

commonalities,

Be that as it may,

I

believe that consideration of the

possible distinctions [i.e., scientific methods] would
appear to be a reasonable pursuit given the groundwork
laid in the present discussion.

However, if such dis-

tinctions are to be made, if social science is to lay

claim to special achievements or potentialities, then
these claims of distinction must reside within a recog-

nition that social inquiry is a fundamentally human social
activity.
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